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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. CENTRAL THEMES  
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the decision to invade Iraq and remove 
Saddam Hussein from power was based on many factors, which were primarily focused 
on strategic significance and operational feasibility.  Remarkably, the Bush 
administration began the march to war with incomplete information in both of these 
areas.  Given the lack of solid data, many questionable assumptions drove the 
administrations decisions.  With respect to feasibility, perhaps the most questionable 
assumptions revolved around Iraqs majority Shii population.  The administrations 
conventional wisdom suggested that the Shiis would unanimously support a long-term 
alliance with the U.S. government and would embrace a secular, democratic form of 
governance.  The administration also assumed a Shii-dominated government would be 
friendly to the West, and would serve as a beacon of democracy to other Middle 
Eastern states struggling with reform.  Surprisingly, these assumptions appear to have 
differed sharply from those held within the U.S. government just a decade prior.   
Through most of the 1980s and indeed into the early 1990s, the U.S. government 
held markedly different view of Shiisit considered them radical, revolutionary, and 
decidedly anti-Western.  As a result, for over 20 years the U.S. government set about 
containing the perceived Shii threat.  This was evident by U.S. policies toward Shiis in 
the aftermath of Desert Storm, and the new dual containment strategies implemented 
in May of 1993.  While focus shifted increasingly toward Sunni-based terrorism in the 
1990s, and particularly toward al-Qaeda, what caused perceptions toward Shiis to shift 
so drastically within the U.S. government?1  How did the U.S. government stop viewing 
Shiis as a radical band of militant Islamists dedicated to exporting the revolution in Iran 
worldwide, and start seeing in Iraq a monolithic community of democracy-hungry, pro-
Western supporters?  How did this shift occur in less than a decade?  
                                                
1 Perception  used to represent both the degree of understanding within the U.S. government, as 
well as referring to the spin placed on information to accommodate the political and strategic context of 
a given point in time. 
2 
This thesis seeks to answer these questions, tracing the twisted genealogy of the 
U.S. governments ideas about Shiis, and focusing on how and why these perceptions 
changed.  For the most part, perceptions within the U.S. government toward Shiis have 
been largely incorrect, leading, among other things, to a post-war environment in Iraq 
that is far different from what the U.S. government expected.  It is an environment now 
littered with tremendous obstacles, costly setbacks, and uncertain outcomes.  Now, as 
the U.S. government relies increasingly upon the Shii to restore order and bring 
stability to post-war Iraq, it is essential that this community is adequately understood.  
This thesis presents a more historically accurate view of the Shii, and thus aids in a 
greater understanding of Iraqs Shiis and their historical relationship to the U.S. 
government and its policies.  
Neither Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) nor Desert Storm represented Americas 
first exposure to Shiism.  In the 1970s the U.S. government inherited significant 
strategic challenges in the Middle East as a result of Britains withdrawal.  It also 
inherited many British perceptions, themselves created through decades of experience in 
the region.  As the U.S. government became increasingly involved in Middle Eastern 
affairs, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and U.S. involvement in Lebanon in the early 
1980s further shaped its early perceptions of Shiis as radical, revolutionary, and anti-
western. 
However, as the U.S. government prepared to invade Iraq in 2002, these 
perceptions shifted dramatically to accommodate its visions for a post-war Iraq.  The 
strategic dilemma of terrorism combined with the attacks of September 11, created a 
revised paradigm that manipulated the way information was both received and 
processed.  The result were decision-making and planning processes that became 
selective, prioritizing information that supported the objectives of the U.S. government 
in Iraq, such as the anticipated Shii reaction, while discrediting and ignoring 
information that did not.  This environment facilitated the development of a series of 
erroneous underlying assumptions by the administration about Iraqs Shii majority, 
assumptions that became increasingly vital to the success of the war plan as it evolved.     
3 
The remainder of this chapter provides a necessary context for linking 
perceptions and common understandings of the Shiis to U.S. foreign policy.  This 
relationship is established by summarizing the strategic framework that governed the 
decision to invade Iraq.  After September 11, the administration felt compelled to take 
preemptive action in the Middle East.  It is therefore important to understand the 
perceived necessity for success in Iraq within the overall strategic context.  Altered 
perceptions of Iraqs Shiis prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom were a decisive factor in 
that foreign policy decision.     
B. THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA  
The U.S. government inherited its security role in the Gulf following Britains 
withdrawal from the region in 1971.  Initially, this role was managed by leveraging the 
capabilities of regional allies to assure stability, and introducing military force only in 
those cases when this was not enough.  In the 1970s the U.S. government relied on the 
twin pillars of Saudi Arabia and Iran to achieve these goals.  However, in 1979 the 
Islamic revolution in Iran lead to a major shift in this policy.  Containment of radical 
Iran became the priority, and the U.S. government found a useful ally in Saddam 
Husseins Iraq.  In August of 1990, this policy came to an abrupt end with Iraqs 
invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent military response from the U.S. government, 
which led a coalition against Iraq.  Through the 1990s U.S. policy attempted to maintain 
a careful balancing act between dual containment with respect to Iran and Iraq, and 
shaky regional alliances, such as the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC).  For many U.S. 
policymakers, the events of September 11 indicated the failure of these previous policies 
of containment and regional alliances.2  New threats had emerged.  They were threats 
that had a solid ideological and social foundationdecades of U.S. foreign policy in the 
Middle East, such as U.S. support for Israel and the Saudi regime, as well as the 
socioeconomic malaise that spread across the region and stalled growth.3  These events 
also suggested that limited forward deployed U.S. forces, which had increased 
throughout the 1990s, could not contain emerging terrorist threats.  
                                                
2 From a neoconservative perspective, which will be further discussed in this thesis. 
3 Nader Fergany et al., The Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for 
Future Generations (New York: UNDP, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2002), 6,41-50. 
4 
The U.S. governments strategic interests in the region are twofold: oil and the 
nonproliferation of WMD.  Though the United States relies on the Middle East for less 
than 25% of its oil needed to meet its demand, oil from the region still forms a crucial 
and irreplaceable part of its energy equation.4  More importantly, the U.S. economy is 
inextricably tied to that of the globalizing nations of the world; shocks to any part of this 
integrated economy resonate throughout the whole.  Unstable oil prices thus create 
enormous instability throughout the world economy, and with projected demands for oil 
rising exponentially, this region will remain a principal strategic interest for the 
foreseeable future.5  In the late 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. government also made the 
nonproliferation of WMD a strategic interest.6  The acquisition of such capabilities by 
regimes intent upon using them as instruments of coercion is an obvious threat to U.S. 
interests.  In addition, the threat of WMD complicates the increasing forward presence 
of the U.S. military within the region by expanding the threat environment in which 
these forces operate.  This threat in turn could weaken or impede the ability of U.S. 
forces to respond effectively to regional aggression or instability.7 
The U.S. governments previous containment strategy for Iraq emphasized three 
components: economic sanctions; forced disarmament of alleged WMD programs and 
stockpiles (to include subsequent inspections); and no-fly zones.  The decision to 
remove Saddam Hussein can be attributed to the failure of this policy, the events of 
September 11, as well as the successful removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, 
which became a model for strategy vis-à-vis Iraq.  The rising neo-conservative 
component of the Bush administration also developed a fourth justification.8  If 
Saddams regime could be replaced by a thriving secular democracy friendly to the 
West, then perhaps Iraq could serve as a model for successful reform throughout the 
region.   
                                                
4 International Energy Outlook 2004, www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf.ieo, 11 Oct, 2004. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002. 
7 Andrew Rathmell, Theodore Karasik, and David Gompert, A New Persian Gulf Security System 
(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003), 4-8. 
8 Faleh A. Jabar, The Shiite Movement in Iraq, (London: Saqi Books, 2003), 16-17. 
5 
The neo-conservatives are an increasingly powerful faction within the 
administration influenced by the works of Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis in 
viewing conflict in the post-Cold War era as a Clash of Civilizations.9   They also 
believe that future policy should advocate an aggressive unilateralist approach to assure, 
by whatever means necessary, continued U.S. hegemony by countering alliances that 
could threaten it.  One of the leaders of this group is Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz, who in May of 1990 briefed President George Bush Sr. on such an approach.  
While Wolfowitz ideas were initially received with much enthusiasm, they were largely 
dismissed during the Clinton administration which instead advocated multilateral 
engagement, akin to Powells strategy.10  However, in 2000, the neocons were 
catapulted to power with the election of George W. Bush, and they currently hold 
influential positions within the administration, especially the Department of Defense. 
September 11 strengthened the neoconservative position.  The question of 
regime change in Afghanistan became a relatively easy sell domestically.  In the 
following months, public support for the President and the Secretary of Defense rose to 
unprecedented levels (87% and 82%, respectively).  An emboldened administration 
began a dramatic shift in foreign policy.  Although regime change in secular Iraq would 
prove to be a more challenging case to make to the American public, the idea progressed 
under the justification of removing state-sponsored terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction.  As the U.S. government struggled to respond to the events of September 
11, an alternative strategy began to appear, one that could potentially replace the Saudi 
support for Wahabbis, now viewed by many administration officials as an association 
irredeemably infected with a dangerous Islamism, similar to that which fueled the 
Afghanistan jihad.11   As Professor Juan Cole, head of the Middle East Studies 
Association at the University of Michigan, described it: 
 
                                                
9 Samuel P. Huntington, A Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, v72, n3. 
10 Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, The New Yorker, 01 April 2002, 2-3. Wolfowitzs 
brief was so well received that Colin Powells scheduled brief for an alternative option was postponed.  
11 Jihad  Religious struggle. The term can be used to reflect internal conflicts or tests of faith, or 
external contests with the enemies of Islam. 
6 
In response to this challenge (September 11) the Bush administration saw 
the possibility of creating a new pillar for U.S. policy in the region: a 
post-Baathist Iraq, dominated by Iraqi Shiis, which would spark a wave 
of democratization across the Middle East.12 
This perspective has been promulgated by Ahmad Chalabi and throughout the Pentagon, 
the office of the Vice-President, and the National Security Council, as well as by 
members of Congress who envision a secular and democratic Iraq.13   
This scenario, however, has been constructed upon a series of erroneous 
assumptions and misperceptions, many of which relate to Iraqs Shii majority.  The 
U.S. government based the feasibility of the regime removal option on three principal 
assumptions about Iraqi Shii.14  First, the administration believed the Shii represented 
a tightly-knit, monolithic community, unified toward common social and political 
reforms.15  Second, it thought the Shii would welcome and support a long-term alliance 
with the U.S. government16  Third, the administration assumed a U.S.-imposed, secular 
democracy would succeed and endure in Iraq.17   
These misperceptions were instrumental in shaping views within the United 
States, both within the administration and in the public at large, regarding the feasibility 
and expense of the liberation of Iraq.  After the war, the implications of these 
erroneous assumptions have come to light, resulting in tremendous setbacks on the 
ground in terms of shaping reform and rebuilding Iraq.  The ramifications for the 
administration and our policy makers are important as they attempt to understand and 
reverse these costly mistakes.  To complicate the issue, withdrawal is not an option, 
since there is no other power to fill the vacuum created by a U.S. departure.  A U.S. 
withdrawal from the region would undermine regional stability and weaken U.S. 
national interests. 
                                                
12Juan Cole, On the history of Americas would be allies. Available from 
http://www.juancole.com, 1.  Accessed Sept, 2004. 
13 Jabar, 16-17. 





This thesis will explain how the U.S. governments perceptions of Shiis were 
formulated and how they shifted to accommodate its visions for a post-war Iraq.  
Chapter II analyzes the origins of U.S. perceptions toward Shii Islam.  It explains how 
early perceptions were inherited from the British, and were later solidified through the 
U.S. governments experiences in Iran and Lebanon.  Chapter III explains how the U.S. 
government transitioned from viewing Shiis as a significant threat to considering them 
potential allies.  It discusses the impact of September 11 on the decision-making and 
planning processes which created an environment that tended to prioritized information 
based on how well it supported the evolving war plan.  Perceptions of Shiis that 
supported this plan were no longer viewed objectively under scrutiny, and became part 
of the foundation that its success was contingent upon.  Chapter IV offers a revised view 
of Shiis in Iraq that conflicts with U.S. perspectives at the start of OIF.  It challenges 
the notions of the Shiis as monolithic and the appeal of a long-term alliance with the 
U.S., under an imposed secular democracy.  It will summarize the history of Iraqs 
Shiis, and will demonstrate that a careful analysis of this history over the past three 
decades would have disabused many of the misperceptions held by the U.S. 
administration.  Finally, the conclusion reinforces the importance of cultural, historical, 
and ideological knowledge of Iraqs people, of which accurate assessments cannot be 
taken lightly.  It asserts that these factors can create their own realities on the ground, 
realities with which U.S. policy must come to terms.  The U.S. government cannot 
impose a solution that is not desired by the Shiis, or the Iraqi people.  It will conclude 
by positing that only through greater understanding and cooperation with the Shiis can 
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II. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
A. WESTERN ORIENTALISM 
This chapter explores the origins of initial U.S. perspectives regarding the Shii.  
It will explain how these perceptions were inherited from the British in the 1970s, and 
were later shaped by the U.S. governments experiences in Iran and Lebanon.  The end 
results were lingering perceptions that promulgated throughout the United States from 
the 1980s through most of the 1990s, of Shiis as a monolithic, radical, anti-western 
movement.    
Western perspectives toward Arab culture have often been influenced by 
Orientalism which manifests itself in literature, film, and other forms of popular 
culture, such as Arabian Nights, North American Review, and Mahomet and His 
Successors as examples.  In Orientalist frameworks, the Arab is often portrayed as the 
double-dealing, sword-wielding miscreant, while the hero, perhaps while even being 
portrayed as Arabic, exhibits Western cultural norms.  Michael Hunt argues that 
Anglo-Saxon racism and Social Darwinism have become fused in the American mind.  
In other words, Americans believe the civilized powersthe United States and 
Western Europeare somehow in control of or responsible for, lesser races in a 
descending social ladder of underdeveloped and even primitive cultures.18  Edward Said 
suggests that this perspective has often rationalized the imperial ambitions of superior 
civilizations at the expense of the inferior.  British Orientalists juxtaposed Ottoman 
despotism, Islamic obscurantism, and Arab racial inferiority to create an image of an 
inferior, backward civilization in desperate need of Western tutelage and modernity.19 
Western perceptions of Islam are also laden with radical, revolutionary, and anti-
American overtones, particularly when the media refers to fundamentalism, Islamic 
terror, and jihad.  Shiis have often been further stereotyped as a revolutionary 
                                                
18 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, (Chapel 
Hill, University of North Carolina, 2002), 10. 
19 Ibid. 
10 
minority within the Islamic faith, both within the Arab world as well as abroad.20  Shii 
theology professes a different perspective than Sunni Islam on the development of 
authority within the faith.  It holds that all true Muslims are equal before the eyes of god, 
and that mortal man has no legitimate authority over other men.  Over the centuries, this 
has often been a source of concern for ruling classes, whose authority was apparently 
threatened by the Shii imams.21  In addition, despite these strongly-held beliefs, 
throughout history Shiis have at many times been a subjugated minority.  In order not to 
defy the will of God, the doctrine of taqiyya, or religious dissimulation, enabled Shiis to 
endure such periods without a declaration of jihad.  At times, this required a denial or 
concealment of their true faith.22  Such defensive measures, in turn, made Shiis appear 
to be deceptive to other Muslims.    
In addition to these stereotypes, the U.S. governments views toward Shiis were 
also shaped through a series of significant events.  As the U.S. government inherited the 
Western imperial mandate following Britains withdrawal from the Middle East in the 
1970s, the legacy of British occupation served as a base of knowledge for later 
American endeavors.  The Iranian Revolution and ensuing hostage crisis later exposed 
America to the potency of political Islam.  Khomeinis threats to export the radical 
ideology of the revolution through Islamist militancy opened a new era in the 1980s, one 
sometimes thought of as religious terrorism.23  Finally, Lebanon exemplified not only 
Irans willingness to support and encourage revolutionary terrorism abroad, but also 
signified new dimensions of state involvement fueled by religious justifications.24   
B. THE GREAT IRAQI REVOLUTION 
When entering World War I on the side of the Axis powers, Turkey made a fatal 
decision that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  The British, upon learning that 
                                                
20 Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2002), 173-188, and Bruce 
Leroy Woodyard, Revolution or Realism: United States-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War Era 
(Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 1993), 45. 
21 Imam  A religious leader among the Shii, appointed by Allah to act as both a religious and social 
leader in all aspects of life. 
22 Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practice (London: Routledge, 2001), 119-
121. 




Turkish neutrality had finally caved under significant political pressures, landed an 
expeditionary force at al Faw and began an overland advance toward Basra.  The 
provinces of Basra and Baghdad were significant to the British for several reasons.  
They were centrally and strategically located, were key terrain in controlling the 
overland trade routes, possessed tremendous oil reserves, and represented a new front 
for the war with which the British sought to check any advance by the Axis.25  
By the fall of 1915, Britain had seized Basra from Ottoman forces and controlled 
the majority of the provincial cities.  However, hasty attempts to seize Baghdad by 
General Charles Townsend failed, and Turkish forces laid siege to the British held up in 
al Kut for over 140 days.  A successful assault on the province of Baghdad was finally 
organized in the spring of 1917 under General Stanley Maude.  The fall of Baghdad was 
a decisive victory.  Although it took British forces over a year to consolidate their gains, 
a successful campaign launched in the spring of 1918 resulted in the seizure of Mosul by 
the following fall.  The British proceeded to occupy Iraq as a liberating force against 
Ottoman occupation, simultaneously proclaiming that Arabs would soon regain control 
over much of their own affairs. 
Iraq was subsequently created on 10 August 1920, by combining the Ottoman 
provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.26  Even under former Ottoman rule, these 
provinces, among the most ethnically and religiously diverse regions of the empire, had 
been notoriously poor and unstable.  Within Iraq, for example, lies Karbala, an ancient 
city that witnessed the birth of Shiism that sparked the historical feud against Sunni 
Islam during the seventh century.  The arbitrary manner in which territorial borders were 
selected during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 demonstrated that Europe had little 
concept of such divisions.27 
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British policy in Iraq proceeded through several stages.28  The first centered 
upon strategic and economic considerations, and from the beginning of the war until 
1918 Britain was intent upon the annexation of these provinces.  However, American 
participation in the war and the growing influence of President Wilsons liberalism 
undermined this option, and thus initiated the formal mandate processes through the 
League of Nations.29  The mandate resulted in a conflict of interests for Britain: while 
pursuing regional interests, namely access to oil and trade routes, it had no real stake in 
investing in the long-term viability of the Iraqi state.  
The post-war Iraqi government was placed under the control of high 
commissioner Sir Percy Cox and a deputy, Colonel Arnold Wilson, who subsequently 
inherited a plethora of preexisting social and economic problems.  These problems were 
only exacerbated by the war and subsequent occupations.  Before the mandate was even 
planned there were already significant protests and grievances.  In addition, one of the 
most troubling trends for the British was the rising sense of nationalism in post-war Iraq.   
In May of 1920, a confluence of events resulted in a massive uprising against 
British occupation.  The death of an influential Shii mujtahid, Sunni/Shii collaboration 
at political rallies against the occupation, the celebration of Ramadan, and the arrests of 
several religious leaders at protests and political rallies, all set the conditions for 
revolt.30  News of the mandate rallied additional supporters and synergized protests.  
Many Iraqis considered the mandate a ruse for colonial imperialism.  They also believed 
that increased self governance would lead to independence.  Although a local delegation 
met with British officials to demand independence, they were dismissed as being a 
handful of ungrateful politicians.31  This further exacerbated social tensions and 
combined with the growing political fervent of nationalism.  Imam Shirazi, a grand 
mujtahid in Karbala organized the political and social dissent, distributing flags, 
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pamphlets, and later organizing the insurgents with the help of his son Mirza 
Muhammad Riza.  Later Shirazi issued a fatwa, or religious edict, condemning British 
rule as the hegemony of non-Muslims over Muslims.  He called for formal jihad against 
the British.  The revolt spread rapidly down the Euphrates River Valley and into the 
marshes and southern provinces of Iraq.  Here, the Shii eagerly rose against this new 
form of centralized government that challenged their tribal and patrimonial social 
structures.   
Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolution was an 
unprecedented event and united the various tribal, religious, and cultural groups in a 
common cause.  It took British forces almost six months to extinguish the remaining 
resistance, at a cost of over 40 million pounds and 450 British soldiers.32  On the 
opposing side, the revolt claimed the lives of over 10,000 Iraqis.  The immense cost, 
coupled with a war-wearied public, initiated a third phase in the political evolution of 
Britains mandate.  
Toward the end of 1920, the British faced a significant political dilemma in Iraq. 
They desired to pursue regional interests, yet they needed to do so with minimal costs 
and responsibilities for the crown.  At the same time, however, they needed to meet the 
minimum requirements of the mandate.  When searching for representatives to fill key 
governmental roles in the emerging state, recent events had a tremendous impact on the 
decision-making process.  The British sought Ottoman administrative and military elites 
who were displaced during the war to fill government positions, because they were 
experienced, and understood the relationship that Britain expected to have with Iraq.  
That is, they understood the need to secure Iraqs power base in the region, while 
simultaneously not hinder Britains pursuit of other regional goals.  These Ottoman 
elites were predominately Sunni, and they were instrumental in shaping Sunni 
dominance in Iraqi politics despite the Shii majority.33  They also reflect emerging 
views within the British administrative council toward Iraqs Shiis. 
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British attitudes toward Iraqis were influenced by the Orientalist discourse that 
prevailed at the time.  British understanding of Iraqi society was contingent on 
establishing rigid boundaries between ethnic, religious, and social groupings.  
Orientalism provided the rhetoric necessary to fill in the gaps and rank various groups 
according to work ethic, progressive thought, and most importantly their willingness to 
cooperate with British administrators.  In addition, Orientalism determined how Islam 
was perceivedit was thought to be a constraint on the development of Iraqi society.34  
The Jews and the Christiansare the most progressive of the inhabitants 
of the country.  Although they number only about 7 percent of the 
population, the proportion of wealth in their hands must be very much 
greater.  They are more interested in the development of the country.35    
From the British perspective, Islam thus hindered development, and of the two 
principal Islamic divisions, the Shiis were viewed as the more Islamic, and hence the 
most backward.  Following the revolution, the British increasingly came to view the 
Shii mujtahids, who represent the core of Shii Islam, as promoters of a philosophy 
fundamentally opposed to progress.  Furthermore, as icons in pursuit of a theocratic 
state, the mujtahids were blamed for inciting and prolonging the Iraqi uprising, 
particularly in the Shii dominated south.  Gertrude Bell, who at the time was considered 
one of the most authoritative writers on the Middle East,36 compared the Shii mujtahids 
to alien popes who in exercising real temporal authority obstructed the 
Government at every turn.37       
When the British sought a more advisory role consistent with the tenets of the 
mandate system, a principal consideration became the costs and resources involved in 
modern state building.  Encumbered by significant economic burdens in the aftermath of 
World War I, Britain searched for a cost effective way to secure regional interests while 
still meeting the minimum requirements and responsibilities as outlined in the mandate.  
As a result, Britain replaced the existing decentralized Ottoman model with a more 
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centralized government.  This new model resulted in a disproportionate Sunni influence 
within the central government that exacerbated Sunni/Shii conflict. 
The British experience in Iraq created the initial Western perceptions, 
perceptions that propagated through pervasive Orientalist thought in Western media.  As 
the United States began to exert greater influence within the region following World 
War Two, many of these perceptions came to be adopted by the new power.  They were 
strengthened by the cultural and political affinities between the United States and Great 
Britain.  This collection of ideas and attitudes laid a foundation for perspectives towards 
Iraq within the U.S. government.  Furthermore, subsequent revolutionary movements in 
the broader Shii world would continue to shape how the West related to Shiism. 
C. THE 1979 IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
The Iranian Revolution fundamentally altered the regions politics and security.  
The 1979 revolution transformed a pro-Western monarchy under the Shah, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, into a radical, Islamist theocracy under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  
During this period, the principal U.S. policy objectives were the containment of Soviet 
expansion, the steady and secure flow of Middle East oil, and the safeguarding of 
Israel.38  Unfortunately, as the end of the Cold War would reveal, the emphasis on 
Soviet containment effectively overshadowed the numerous smaller conflicts.  Such was 
the nature of the U.S. governments support to the Shah, placed on the Iranian throne in 
1953 with the help of a CIA engineered coup to thwart the possibility of a Communist 
takeover.  U.S. policymakers perceived that the most critical challenges facing Iran at 
the time were economic modernization and land reform.  The U.S. government sought to 
defend Iran from internal Communist threats by encouraging the Shah to facilitate 
prosperity and stability through reform. The Shah however, became increasingly 
concerned with external threats and the expansion of Iranian influence in the region.  A 
CIA report to President Eisenhower on 7 April, 1960 darkly warned that the Shahs 
reforms have alienated new groups of people without causing any groups already 
opposed to the Shah to come over to his side.39  Furthermore, in a later reevaluation of 
U.S. policy toward Iran, NSC 6010 concluded that without significant reforms the 
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monarchy would probably collapse.40  It also revealed the conundrum facing U.S. 
policymakers: there were few viable pro-Western alternative leaders who could mitigate 
internal dissent.  Thus, while the Shah was slow in undertaking the necessary reforms, 
Eisenhower had no option but to keep U.S. aid flowing in hopes of containing a possible 
revolution.41 
The Kennedy administration took more aggressive actions, eventually pressuring 
the Shah to initiate internal reforms subsequently known as the White Revolution.  
The Shahs reform package proposed land and labor reforms, nationalization of forests 
and pastureland, profit sharing in both industrial and private sectors, amendments to 
electoral law, and the creation of a Literacy Corps.42   However, these reforms also 
created new challenges for U.S. sponsorship in Iran.  The U.S. government had to ensure 
that reforms progressed at a pace sufficient to garner lower-class support while 
preventing economic collapse.  In addition, the U.S. government needed to encourage 
the Shah to develop effective counter-insurgency and police forces necessary to maintain 
internal stability.43  Kennedys Middle East experts prophesied:  
The success of the Shahs program over the long run may well rest on the 
extent to which it is identified as an indigenous effort...the Shahs 
greatest liability may well be his vulnerability to charges by both 
reactionary and radical opposition elements that he is a foreign puppet.44      
On 3 June, 1963, this is precisely what occurred.  The Ayatollah Khomeini 
openly denounced the Shah, labeling him an American puppet in response to the Shahs 
earlier denouncement of the clergy as parasitic agents of black reaction with whom 
progress was synonymous with blasphemy.45  Through his fiery sermons and rhetoric 
laden with Islamist appeal, Khomeini quickly became a leader for groups opposed to the 
Pahlavi dynasty.  With U.S. diplomatic support, the Shah began an aggressive campaign 
of brutal crackdowns that resulted in thousands of deaths and the house arrest of 
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numerous clerics and opposition leaders.46  By the end of 1964, Khomeini was exiled 
from Iran.  At the time, the Kennedy administration did not understand the implications 
of Khomeinis rising popularity and continued to support and encourage the Shahs 
reforms.  Under the Johnson administration, the Shahs White Revolution was again 
viewed positively.  Such optimism also prevailed during both the Nixon and Ford 
administrations. These administrations repeatedly overstated the positive impact of the 
White Revolution.  Completely unaware of fervor rising from below, Ford and Kissinger 
even pondered the application of the Iranian model to the neighboring state of 
Afghanistan.  
Despite considerable growth in the Iranian economy between 1963 and 1967, 
heavy inflation persisted and the middle class saw few positive effects.  The Shah 
expended this new found oil wealth on the pursuit of personal ambitions, investing 
heavily in weapons systems such as tanks, aircraft, and other hardware purchased 
primarily from the United States.  The Western-focused elite consumed conspicuously, 
angering those outside such circles, including the religious leadership. 
President Carter was not convinced of the viability of the Shahs regime and 
grew increasingly concerned about the effects of massive social reforms enacted in a 
relatively short span on a very traditional society.  The White Revolution had done much 
to raise societal expectations at all levels, but provided only an illusion of political 
freedom.  Carter strongly advocated democracy and human rights, encouraging the Shah 
to open the political process in Iran and ease some of the authoritarian measures.  In 
1977 the Shah conceded to pressure from Carter, which included a threat of reduced 
arms sales, and released over 300 political prisoners, reduced censorship, and initiated 
several judicial reforms.  But the measures backfired, as the various opposition groups 
became increasingly emboldened against the regime. 
Prior to 1978 most opposition to the Shah came from the urban middle classes, 
which were most affected by the White Revolution.  They were predominately secular in 
nature and could conceivably support a constitutional monarchy.  One of the leading 
opposition leaders was Mehdi Bazargan, a liberal secularist who by default became the 
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backup plan for U.S. policy makers in the event of a regime collapse.  Washington 
overlooked the rising force of political Islam, which coalesced under such leaders as Ali 
Shariati.  As Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to Carter, recalled, 
Islamic fundamentalism, a phenomenon largely ignored in our intelligence reports, was 
now openly challenging the existing order.47   
It was the Islamists who represented the greatest potential for social 
mobilization.  Despite being in exile, Khomeini continued exert tremendous influence in 
Iran through a support network that smuggled audio-taped sermons and lectures into the 
country.  Although previously divided, the Shii ulama unified as the Shah adopted more 
repressive measures to save his regime.48  In January of 1978, an official press story 
attacked Khomeini, which galvanized support amongst students and religious leaders, 
and resulted in protests against the Shah in the city of Qom.  In a series of such events, 
the regime adopted increasingly brutal measures to quell the opposition.  The Shahs 
repressive measures only heightened social unrest.  In September of 1978 the Shah 
declared martial law. On 8 September he unleashed the full potency of the modernizing 
military, killing 400 and wounding over 4000 demonstrators, a day remembered as 
Black Friday.49   
Though U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan doubted the regime could survive, 
the United States refused to abandon its ally despite the urging from several advisors to 
explore alternative pro-Western coalitions.  This represented a missed opportunity for 
the U.S. government.  By not engaging or supporting Mehdi Bazargan earlier, since he 
was later appointed Prime Minister by Khomeini, the U.S. government contributed to his 
eventual marginalization and lost a potential ally.  He resigned allegedly in response to 
the crisis.  It was not until the beginning of December that the administration realized 
the gravity of the situation.  George Ball, a Democratic advisor, summarized the 
situation in a report given to President Carter on 11 December: 
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We made the Shah what he is to become.  We nurtured his love for 
grandiose geopolitical schemes and we supplied him with the hardware to 
indulge his fantasies.Once we had anointed him as protector of out 
nations interests in the Persian Gulf, we became dependent on him.  
Now that his regime is coming apart under the pressure of imported 
modernization, we have so committed ourselves as to have no ready 
alternative.50 
On December 12 two million protesters filled the streets of Tehran.  As the Shah ordered 
the army to respond, several units disintegrated and refused to fire on unarmed civilians.  
Facing increasing pressure from Washington, and the rapid loss of military control, the 
Shah placated the protesters with a constitution and by appointing the moderate Shapour 
Bakhtiar as Prime Minister.  However by this time the regime could not be saved and the 
Shah fled on 16 January 1979. 
The Shahs departure represented the collapse of almost three decades of 
diplomatic efforts to reinforce a highly valued pro-Western regime, which also served as 
a bulwark toward Soviet expansionism, one of the twin pillars at the height of the 
Cold War.  As a result, the Carter administration focused on damage control and 
attempted to salvage relations with the emerging post-Shah regime.  Conflicting 
strategies emerged from Washington.  Carter insisted on supporting the existing 
government, but preventing the inclusion of Khomeini, while Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance wanted to include Khomeini as a means of widening Baktiars base of popular 
support.  Meanwhile, Brezezinski aggressively pursued the option of a military coup.  
By mid-February all three strategies had failed.  Khomeini refused to be co-opted into 
the existing regime, the army began to disintegrate from within, and as a result of losing 
his military base, Bakhtiar resigned and fled into hiding.51   
Khomeinis return on 1 February 1979 began the second phase of the revolution, 
often referred to as the Islamic Revolution.  In the aftermath of the Shahs departure, 
the religious scholars successfully re imposed order.  This was achieved by organizing 
local revolutionary cells, what later became the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, and a 
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volunteer force known as the Baseej.52  During the next several months, two centers of 
power emerged within Iran.  Mehdi Bazargan, who was appointed as Prime Minister by 
Khomeini, led the Freedom Movement and tried to establish a liberal and secular 
government.  Khomeini, who was gaining increasing leverage and legitimacy amongst 
the clerics, formed the Islamic Republic Party.  While the parties initially cooperated, 
tensions arose due to Khomeinis efforts to expand the role of the clergy within the 
government in a system of velayat-e faqih, or the guardianship of the religious jurist.       
Attempting to come to terms with the revolution, the Carter administration tried 
to pacify Khomeini by disassociating itself from the Shah, and reducing public 
criticisms of Irans human rights abuses.53  However, Khomeini continued to condemn 
openly the United States as the Great Satan and to denounce the Shah as a vile 
traitor.  Deliberate attempts by the administration to engage the Bazargan government 
through a series of arms sales, intelligence, and diplomatic exchanges, while generating 
some interest, were used by Khomeini to wrest greater control from the Freedom 
Movement.  Thus the decision in October of 1979 to allow the Shah entry into the 
United States for medical treatment drew considerable concern from Bazargan.  
Khomeini also recognized the opportunity to further marginalize Bazargan, while 
Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi publicly criticized both the Shah and Bazargan for 
collaborating with the U.S. government, and urged his people to demonstrate against the 
U.S. government. Through the same mechanisms used to establish the Revolutionary 
Guards, Khomeini gained control of the judicial tribunals, and achieved greater control 
over the state infrastructure.  After rejecting a draft constitution proposed by the 
Freedom Movement, a new constitution was enacted the following December which 
appointed Khomeini the faqih, or supreme decision maker for life.   
The seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran was allegedly aimed at capturing 
evidence of U.S. government espionage activities.  In the aftermath, however, students 
claimed it was done in retaliation for the U.S. governments support of the Shah and his 
totalitarian rule.  The imprisonment of sixty-six Americans was effectively endorsed by 
Khomeini, who continued to denounce the United States.  The ensuing 444-day hostage 
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crisis not only signified the total defeat of the U.S. governments policy toward Iran, but 
also served as a stark reminder of the nature of the new regime.  The U.S. government 
perceived the crisis as a terrorist attack endorsed by a state in complete defiance of 
international norms.  Within Iran, the crisis signaled the regimes anti-Western stance, 
and also the successful defiance of the United States by the new Islamic regime.  The 
inability to secure the timely release of American citizens, including a failed rescue 
attempt in 1980, further eroded American prestige and influence and undermined 
Carters reelection bid.54  
While the U.S. government may have been slow to recognize and respond to the 
rising challenges of Islamism before the fall of the Shah, in the aftermath the 
implications of Khomeinis emerging ideology became clear.  Khomeini personified the 
regimes new character.  His ideology quickly enveloped Irans foreign policy, in what 
became an even more expansionist threat than that previously proposed by the 
Pahlavis.55  In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, a series of Shii uprisings 
erupted in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Pakistan.56  Although most were minor 
and quickly quelled, they seemed to indicate a growing solidarity amongst Shiis 
inspired by the Iranian model.  Perhaps nowhere was this perceived threat more grave 
than in Iraq, with its majority Shii population and shared borders with Iran.  This 
perception prompted Iraq to preemptively invade Iran in 1980.  Khomeinis broadcasts 
and trips by his emissaries throughout the Gulf in support of other Islamist movements 
further enhanced the perceived threat of revolution at a time when the Muslim world 
was already infused with a sense of Islamic revivalism.57   
For Shiis and Sunnis alike, Iran exemplified the power of Islam as a vehicle for 
social mobilization and state building.58  At the time, however, Sunnis were less 
receptive to the revolutionary doctrine than their Shii counterparts.  This shaped 
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Western perceptions toward Islam, with Shiis increasingly viewed as the revolutionary 
minority.  Dr Lewis B. Ware, writing for the Air Force Center of Doctrine, Research 
and Education in 1985 observed that: 
As a consequence, (of Iran) the messianic, anti-imperialist, reactionary, 
and highly activist temper of Iranian Shii sectarianism gained the 
attention of the world community.59 
The Iranian Revolution and ensuing hostage crisis thus solidified U.S. 
perceptions toward Shii Islam as a monolithic, violent, and anti-Western sect.  These 
perceptions were reinforced by the prominent position of Khomeini and his active 
attempts to export the revolution to Shiis throughout the Muslim world.  While the 
perceptions of Shiism as a monolithic faith have been tempered considerably in recent 
years, they have not disappeared completely.  Graham Fuller notes that the Iranian 
model is perceived as a model for Islamist regimes that come to power, including Sunni 
regimes such as Sudan; it is thus difficult to imagine an Islamist regime that is friendly 
to the West.60  This has interesting implications for Iraq and the role Islam will 
inevitably play in a post-Saddam government, particularly as Shiis gain unprecedented 
levels of influence and representation within the emerging government.   
D. U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LEBANON 
In retrospect, despite significant apprehension within the United States toward 
the threat Iranian ideology posed toward the region and to U.S. interests, Iran was 
largely unsuccessful in replicating the revolution abroad.  Moreover, Irans promotion of 
other revolutionary movements may have been less aggressive than previously thought.  
The one exception, however, was Lebanon.  Estimates suggest that between 1982 and 
1989 Iran spent at least half a billion dollars in attempting to increase Iranian influence 
among Lebanese Shiis.61  Nonetheless, Augustus Norton suggests that while many if 
not all, Shii Muslims revere Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini as the central contemporary 
system of Islam, only a fraction of Lebanese Shii had affiliations with groups 
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receiving direct Iranian support.62  He also notes that Shii views of the revolution were 
not universal.  While it served as a viable example of how Islam could topple and 
replace an illegitimate government, many Shiis recognized that Iranian solutions 
would not necessarily solve Lebanese problems.63  As such, the Iranian Revolution did 
not radicalize many Shiis in Lebanon; instead, it capitalized on the frustrations of a 
people politicized well before the fall of the Shah in 1979.  Nonetheless, Lebanon 
reinforced previous perceptions within the U.S. government, not only of Iranian 
influences, but of Shii culpability in general, that is, it demonstrated a growing rejection 
of America and the West.  These trends were seemingly exemplified by the terrorist 
attacks in Beirut in October of 1983.   
Lebanon had a much more profound impact on U.S. perceptions toward the 
Shii, as it seemed to have opened the floodgates for generalizations and stereotype.  The 
U.S blamed the bombings on policy mistakes, force protection, intelligence reporting, 
rules of engagement, viability of peacekeeping missions, and diplomatic failures.  What 
was inadequately addressed was the rationality from the Shii perspective.  The answer 
that evolved by default, irrational, radical terrorism, is less problematic than is the wider 
acceptance it generally garnered.  The tough questions were not being asked and 
terrorist and terrorism became labels increasingly easier to apply toward Shiis in 
general.  Nabih Berri has spoken at length about the dignity of the Shii struggle being 
tarnished by terrorism, stating: 
The name of the Shii has become synonymous with terrorism, whereas it 
really is a crown of the struggle and resistance.  A very fine thread 
separates terrorism and the struggle, and we must not cut it.64     
U.S. military involvement in Lebanon was predicated on the historical successes 
of 1958, when U.S. Marines were deployed to calm civil disturbances and facilitate the 
election of President Shihab.  Within three months the Marines were redeployed without 
significant incident, sustaining only a single casualty.  Shihabs government brought 
both stability and the realization that compromise was an absolute necessity in order to 
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make the confessional system function.65  The action established a precedent for U.S. 
success in Lebanon.  The Lebanese government also established a precedent of relying 
on outside powers during domestic crises.   
On the eve of U.S. intervention in 1982, Lebanon was substantially different than 
in 1958.  In 1982 Lebanons population approached three million.  The religious, social, 
and political fabric of this populace was extremely complex.  At the time there were 
over seventeen religious organizations officially recognized, with many more sub 
categorizations and unofficial bodies.66  Sandra Mackey described it as a mosaic of 
varied groups less interested in state formation than their own interests.67  These 
domestic cleavages were exacerbated by external factors as well.  Hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinian refugees added considerably to the social strife in southern 
Lebanon.  In addition, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerillas routinely 
launched attacks into Israel from southern bases, drawing the Israeli military into 
southern Lebanon.  Finally, Lebanons military weakness invited, both intentionally and 
unintentionally, participation from greater powers, such as Syria, that were concerned 
with the larger geopolitical context.  Mackey concluded that the Lebanese civil war was 
not fought with armiesover many square miles but by armed militiasin combat from 
urban block to urban block.68  With upwards of 25,000 Syrian troops in the Bekaa 
valley, and numerous guerilla and paramilitary units engaged in urban combat, Lebanon 
was the proverbial powder keg that exploded when Israel invaded on June 6, 1982.   
On 20 August 1982, 800 U.S. Marines were sent into Lebanon to reduce tensions 
and facilitate the evacuation of PLO and Syrian fighters from Beirut.  The initial success 
of the operation was met with tremendous approval, and by 14 September, U.S. Marines 
effectively withdrew.  However, in less than two weeks, the Marines would be sent back 
in to respond to escalating violence resulting from the assassination of president-elect 
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Bashir Gemayel, and the subsequent retaliation which killed 700 Palestinian and 
Lebanese civilians.   
The decision to commit U.S. forces in Lebanon was unpopular with Congress, 
and the Department of Defense, which had expressed concerns with the anticipated 
length of operations and whether viable objectives could be clearly translated into 
military terms.  What eventually emerged through President Reagans justifications to 
Congress was a series of loose objectives: 
• The permanent cessation of hostilities 
• Establishment of a strong, representative central government 
• Withdrawal of all foreign forces 
• Restoration of control by the Lebanese Government (throughout the 
country) 
• Establish conditions by which Lebanon will no longer be used as a base 
of operations against Israel 
But it was unclear whether the deployed forces had either the muscle or latitude to 
accomplish any, let alone all of these objectives.69 
The first several months of the deployment the MNF mission were fairly smooth.  
But after the initial calm, a time which various factions used to rearm, violence again 
escalated.  On 18 April 1983 the U.S. embassy in Beirut was bombed, killing 63 people.  
By mid-summer Marines were sustaining increasing casualties from artillery and gunfire 
and began to employ greater firepower in self defense.  In September, the U.S. National 
Command Authority (NCA) determined that the security of U.S. forces was contingent 
upon the active defense of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).  This gave U.S. forces an 
active role in an increasingly violent civil war.  The marked increase in U.S. firepower 
brought to bear on Shii and Druze militias resulted in a series of retaliatory attacks.  
These attacks culminated in the bombings of the Marine and French barracks on 23 
October 1983 which claimed the lives of 241 U.S. service members.   
Amidst new Congressional hearings in January of 1984, the Reagan 
administration continued to defend the U.S governments mission to secure the peace in 
Lebanon.  On 22 January, in a televised interview, Secretary of State George Shultz, 
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when asked if the Syrians believed they could simply outwait the U.S. government, 
replied by quoting Syrian Foreign Defense Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam stating, 
The United States is short of breath.  You can always wait them out.70  On 7 February, 
amidst continued violence, Reagan announced his intentions to redeploy U.S. forces.  
On 26 February the last Marines left Beirut, less than three months later the Lebanese 
government cancelled the treaty it had previously signed with Israel on 17 May 1983.   
The U.S. governments experience in Lebanon has arguably fueled the fires of 
political Islam and terrorism, and adversely affected stability in the following years.  
One of the most troubling questions posed in the aftermath was whether anything was 
learned from the experience.  On 7 November 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger convened the DOD Commission on the Beirut International Airport 
Terrorist Act of 23 October 1983.  Assigned to the commission were various military 
and civilian assistance experts.  The report was completed on 20 December 1983.  The 
report detailed ten areas of concern, including: the mission, command relationships, 
intelligence, security, casualty handling, terrorism, and conclusions.   
The report also details the culpability of Iran in the attacks, claiming that 
Iranian operatives in Lebanon are in the business of killing Americans regardless of 
what role they play in the reconciliation process.71   
The only development which would seriously impede the terrorist 
activities of Iranian-dominated Shii groups in Lebanon, short of a 
change of regime in Tehran, would be a decision by Syria to shut down 
the basing facilities in the Bekaa valley and sever the logistical 
pipeline.72 
The report describes the strong family and clan relationships among sectarian rivals, 
particularly problematic amongst radical Shiis.73  With respect to the bombing of the 
Marine barracks, the report surmised: 
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...the 23 October 1983 bombing of the BLT Headquarters building was a 
terrorist act sponsored by sovereign states or organized political entities 
for the purpose of defeating U.S. objectives in Lebanon.74 
That the report failed to scrutinize the causative factors from an opposing 
perspective is not surprising.  Although evidence suggested the implications of Shii 
militants, at the time the emerging entity of Hezbollah was largely unknown.  In addition 
the report was commissioned on behalf of the Marine Commandant, and formed part of 
an analysis of the shortcoming and lessons learned from a DOD perspective.  The 
problem was lack of input from the Department of State, Congress, the National 
Security Council, or even the White House.  The Long report prescribed corrective 
action for how the military could better defend itself from terrorism, which by 
implication was a seemingly inescapable byproduct of U.S. foreign policy.  The role of 
U.S. policy in exacerbating the terrorist threat was downplayed as a cost of doing 
business, and no real effort was made to understand the logic of such terrorism or its 
perpetrators.  The report dismisses the grievances of Syrian and Druze spokesmen 
toward LAF perceptions of them as traitors, opportunists, or unwitting dupes of the 
Maronite establishment, the report states, the factual basis of this perception is moot.75   
As the months passed following the U.S. militarys withdrawal from Lebanon, 
the tragedy of the attacks reinforced perceptions within the United States of the violent 
nature of radical Shiis and the danger they posed to U.S. interests.  The Lebanese 
experience removed both the desire and reason to study the root causes of such 
extremism and solidified previous perceptions of the Shii behind a veil of irrationality.   
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The British experience in the Middle East established the foundation for initial 
U.S. perceptions toward the region.  Significant events such as the Iraqi Revolution of 
1920 focused these perceptions on specific groups, especially the Shii who proved to be 
most problematic during the British mandate period.  These perceptions would persevere 
as Britain withdrew from the region in the 1970s, and influenced the manner in which 
the U.S. government both perceived and responded to the Shiis in the 1980s and 90s.   
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The fall of the Shahs Iranian regime in 1979 to an Islamic revolution both 
signified the failure of U.S. policy and the loss of a prized Cold War ally.  As the U.S. 
government struggled to come to terms with the revolution, the emergence of political 
Islam cast new shadows over the region, as Khomeini threatened to export the revolution 
abroad.  This event not only solidified previous perceptions of the radical and 
revolutionary nature of political Islam, but also exaggerated the appeal of Khomeinis 
ideology to the Shii. 
The U.S. governments experiences in Lebanon, while reinforcing the viability 
of Khomeinis threats, further exemplified perceived collaboration amongst the Shiis as 
a monolithic entity.  In addition, Lebanon also established parallels between Shii Islam 
and terrorism.  The experience effectively removed the notion of a rational, goal-
oriented movement, and replaced it simply with irrational terrorism.  In the aftermath, 
the U.S. government focused on the proximate and logistical causes of the bombings, 
but overlooked the root causes of Islamist terrorism. Such a myopic and expedient 
reading of political Islam contributed to a dramatic shift in U.S. perceptions of the Shiis 
























III. SHIFTING PERCEPTIONS 
A. MAKING REALITY FIT EXPECTATIONS 
Chapter II explored the origin and evolution of the U.S. governments early 
perceptions toward Iraqi Shiis.  In their early form, U.S. opinions of Shiis would not 
have supported even the most basic cooperation with them.  Yet in 2002, these 
perceptions shifted completely.  The Shiis were no longer perceived as an obstacle, 
instead the U.S. government began to view them as a potential allies in its attempt to 
remove Saddam Hussein.  In fact, the evolving war plan relied upon this assumption.  
This chapter explains how and why this shift occurred.  It begins by examining general 
shifts in perception toward Shiis during the 1990s, which were influenced by an 
increasing focus on Sunni-based terrorism.  It then explains two emerging hypotheses, 
each of which partially explains these shifting perceptions within the current 
administration.  The first concerns the influence of non-state actors such as Ahmad 
Chalabi, and the related shortfalls within the U.S. governments intelligence gathering 
and vetting processes.  The second is a paradigmatic shift in the way the problem of 
Saddam was perceived, especially the need to remove his regime, and the resultant 
impact this had on the U.S. governments plans for Iraq.  This chapter concludes by 
discussing the effects of September 11 on the interagency process, a process that 
eventually broke down, and facilitated the aforementioned changes in the manner in 
which the U.S. government viewed the Shii.           
B. THE SUNNI/SHII SWITCH 
Existing Western perceptions of Islam, and the Shiis in particular, were 
reinforced by the increasing religiously-inspired violence of the 1980s and 90s.  From 
1982 to 1989 Shii affiliated terrorist groups were allegedly responsible for over 247 
terrorist incidents, resulting in 1,057 reported deaths.76  Such attacks became 
increasingly lethal.  Whereas between 1982 and 1989 these attacks represented less than 
8% of all recorded terrorist activity, they were nonetheless responsible for over 30% of 
the resulting casualties.77  These observations reveal an interesting corollary between the 
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number of occurrences, lethality, and corresponding perceptions of specific groups.  The 
lethality of these attacks enabled their perpetrators to influence public opinion 
disproportionate to the size of their groups or the number of their attacks.   
1979 was a watershed for Islamist terror.  The significance of the Iranian 
Revolution in rallying radical Shii groups has been previously explored.  However that 
year also witnessed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the beginning of a guerilla 
war which lasted until 1989.  The war in Afghanistan was responsible for not only 
rallying, but also training and equipping many radical Sunni Islamist operatives. With 
the expulsion of the Russians from Afghanistan, and subsequent collapse of the Soviet 
Union, many jihadis remained abroad with renewed convictions in both their ideologies 
and methodologies.78  These fighters later contributed to the spread of violent and 
radical Islamist ideas. 
The rise of Sunni-based terrorism in the 1990s continued previous trends in 
religiously-inspired terrorism, but expanded the target selection list.  Specifically, 
terrorists now selected targets beyond the Middle Eastthe threat had now truly become 
global.  With respect to Western perceptions, no group has been more representative or 
responsible for this evolving ideology than al-Qaeda, with bin Ladens Declaration of 
War.  To the West, much as Shii ideology did during the eighties, the expansion of 
political Islam or fundamentalism is seen as particularly violent and anti-Western.  
Thus, through a combination of rising lethality, sophistication, and the increasing ability 
to identify and focus responsibility on a comprehensive threat (bin Laden and al-Qaeda), 
the Shii have been effectively overshadowed by Sunni-based terror. 
David Plotz, bureau chief for Slate.com, suggests for example, that Shiis were 
increasingly seen as the moderates against a backdrop of extreme Sunni Wahhabism 
symbolized by al-Qaeda and the Taliban.79  This has been reinforced by diplomatic 
overtures from Iran in the wake of September 11, who has consciously curtailed support 
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to Islamist extremists.  In addition, Iran is strongly opposed to the Taliban and bin 
Laden, the former having murdered Afghan Shiis as well as Iranian diplomats.80    
Following the Gulf War in 1991, the regime of Saddam Hussein effectively 
replaced Iran as Americas number one threat in the Middle East.  Despite abandoning 
the Shiis militarily during Iraqs intifada in 1991, America sympathized with the plight 
of Iraqs Shiis under Saddam Hussein.  The southern Shiis have posed the greatest 
internal threat to the regime.  The U.S. government seemed to follow a loose application 
of the Arab axiom of the enemy of my enemy.  That is, Saddams regime repressed 
the Shii, the Shiis must oppose Saddam, and therefore they are aligned with our 
interests.81  This transformation of general perceptions has been referred to as the 
Sunni/Shiite switch.82 
After the war, the decision to topple Saddams regime has received increasing 
amounts of attention in the media, in interagency reports and investigations, and in 
scholarly monographs.  With respect to prewar assumptions pertaining to Shiis, two 
hypotheses explain these shifting perceptions.  The first is the suspected influence of 
Ahmad Chalabi with neoconservative elements in the U.S. government, both in terms of 
shaping policy toward regime removal and in formulating basic assumptions during the 
planning phases of OIF.  The second suggests the U.S. government assumed that the 
post-war environment could be effectively shaped in the aftermath, and was therefore 
not a decisive factor to the overall objectives of regime removal. 
C. THE INFLUENCES OF AHMAD CHALABI 
Ahmad Chalabi was born in October of 1944 to a wealthy Shii family in central 
Baghdad.  He left Iraq with his family in 1958 and has spent the majority of his life in 
the U.S. and in Great Britain.  In 1977, he established the Petra Bank in Jordan, which 
soon collapsed following charges of fraud and corruption.  Although he has adamantly 
denied these charges, he is still wanted in Jordan and faces a possible twenty-two year 
prison sentence.  In 1992, he formed the Iraqi National Congress (INC) an opposition 
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group which was dedicated to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.  In 1993 he presented 
the Clinton administration with a plan entitled The End Game, suggesting that 
Saddams hold over Baghdad was tenuous at best and could conceivably be overthrown 
via an internal insurrection, but one amply supported by the U.S. government.  At the 
time, the CIA was in the throes of a paradigmatic shift in intelligence collection that 
favored technical methodologies over more traditional human intelligence (HUMINT) 
sources.  Robert Baer, who was later directed to support these endeavors as the agent in 
charge described that there was not a single HUMINT asset in either Iraq or the 
neighboring countries that could confirm or deny any of Chalabis assertions.83  
Nonetheless, the Clinton administration provided funding, and with CIA support a small 
base of operations was established in Northern Iraq in 1994.  Less than two years later 
the INC failed to produce any significant results and Chalabis operators were driven out 
by the Northern Iraqi Army.  Over 130 of its members were subsequently executed.84   
Despite these failures, as well as charges of mismanagement and corruption, 
Chalabi was nonetheless able to retain control of the INC and effectively transformed 
the organization into a political rallying point for those advocates of regime removal.  
Although the dynamics of the relationship are not clear it is widely believed that Chalabi 
formulated numerous political contacts via the Project for the New American Century 
(PNAC), a controversial think tank in Washington.  Among the most notable alleged 
contacts of Chalabi were Paul Wolfowitz, Albert Wohlstetter, and Richard Perle.  
Seymour Hersh describes a close personal bond between Chalabi, Wolfowitz and 
Perle, and argues these ties extended to other members of the current administration, 
including Donald Rumsfield, Douglas Feith, and Lewis Libby.85  The aforementioned 
1998 letter to President Clinton, signed by many of these same men reiterated the 
persistent threat of Saddams regime, pointed out the regimes weaknesses, and again 
suggested the viability of a popular uprising, all points that were made in Chalabis 1993 
plan.  The end result was the signing of the Iraqi Liberation Act which allocated $97 
million in training and operational funding for regime removal.  Although the INC  
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received less than $1 million due to continued skepticism within the administration, it 
nonetheless continued to receive operating funds from the Department of State in excess 
of $10 million.86   
The perceived successes in Afghanistan indirectly improved opinions of Chalabi 
in the U.S. defense community.87  The neoconservatives, it seemed, had won the battle 
over Afghanistan despite considerable opposition, which resulted in a euphoric mood 
of cockiness among neocons in Washington.88  Thus, when they turned their attention 
to Iraq, neoconservatives wanted a similar smaller, lighter, faster approach, which was 
precisely what Chalabi offered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through Wolfowitz.  Such a 
plan assumed there would be a Shii-supported uprising in southern Iraq.  Coupled with 
an intense bombing campaign and the insertion of several thousand special forces, Iraqs 
oil infrastructure could be captured, the neocons argued, the regime isolated in Baghdad, 
and sufficient internal dissent created to facilitate regime collapse.  Many 
neoconservatives were thus well aware of the majority Shii populace in Iraq, and were 
reassured by Chalabi and his supporters that Iraqi Shiis were largely secular in mindset 
and uninterested in a Khomeinist theocracy.89  The neocons assumed the INC would 
run post-war Iraq with some semblance of a democratic government.90 
The dissemination of Chalabis proposal among the service components 
immediately generated much opposition to the plan.  It also weakened support for 
regime change.  One of the most influential critics of the plan General Anthony Zinni, 
(retired), who formerly commanded CENTCOM prior to General Tommy Franks 
(retired), raised the principal concern: What should be done after Saddams regime fell?  
The Sunni/Shii/Kurdish mix and underlying social and political conditions under 
Saddams rule made Iraq ripe for civil war.  Zinni suggested that relying on foreign 
fighters without significant U.S. military forces would result in a Bay of Goats.91  
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Others disagreed, however.  Former CIA director James Woolsey, for example, thought 
Iraq possessed a very sophisticated and intellectual infrastructure of highly educated 
people and suggested there is no reason they could not establish a 
federalizeddemocracy.92 
Thus, despite considerable support and confidence from civilian leaders inside 
the Pentagon, Chalabi faced considerable opposition from many corners.  In the long 
run, such opposition may substantially limit future roles he will play in Iraq.  
Nonetheless, Chalabi had much to gain from a U.S. led invasion to topple Saddam.  The 
means were far less important to him, provided he could still get his foot in the door in 
the aftermath.  As the prospects for a war with Iraq seemed increasingly likely, Chalabi 
assumed an expanded role that serves to highlight additional problems with the U.S. 
intelligence process. 
D. CHERRY PICKING AND INTELLIGENCE STOVEPIPES 
In the summer of 2001, Seymour Hersh interviewed a senior Pentagon official 
assigned to evaluate Chalabis assertions and influence with respect to Iraq.93  While not 
intended as a direct attack on Chalabis credibility, the report poked several holes in the 
existing planning assumptions.  When this report was disseminated throughout the 
Pentagon, however, the unnamed source was informed that they should not focus on 
what could go wrong, but rather what could go right.94  Although uncorroborated, there 
are numerous similar allegations that case significant doubt on the lack of objectivity 
within the administration toward such sources.   
Given the paucity of information, it is difficult to discern the extent of Chalabis 
personal networks within the U.S. government or his ability to pass intelligence directly 
to the Pentagon or Vice President.  However, new information suggests several indirect 
methods that Chalabi has used to communicate to the administration.  Specifically, as 
the Bush administration tried to gain U.N. support for operations against Saddam, 
Chalabi appears to have provided scripted intelligence through intermediaries.  Chalabi 
leaked dubious sources to the media, including to The New York Times in December 
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2001 and to Vanity Fair later that spring, as part of a strategy of deception.  When 
published, Chalabis misinformation softened up bureaucratic resistance in 
Washington.95  One of the most controversial cases was a source appropriately named 
Curveball, that Chalabi provided to the Germans. Curveball supposedly had 
information regarding Saddams intentions to build mobile, bio-weapons labs.  A 
corroborating source was then provided to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and 
although Curveball was labeled a fabricator in a highly classified intelligence 
assessment, the publication of his allegations enhanced Curveballs claims. Secretary of 
State Powell has privately blamed Chalabi for providing much of the faulty intelligence 
that he presented to the UN Council in February of 2003 to build the case against Iraqs 
alleged WMD programs.  In May 2004, a Newsweek article effectively summarized 
Chalabis role in the intelligence process: 
With his clever sense for bureaucratic gamesmanship, Chalabi fed the 
neocons hunger for raw intelligence.  If the CIA and other spy services 
were not going to come up with the goods on Saddam, than Chalabi 
would.96  
Chalabi endeavored, by whatever means necessary, to keep the Bush administration on 
course with respect to its plans for regime removal. 
Though Chalabi is an attractive scapegoat to some members of the current 
administration, others doubt he had much clout.  Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy, found the assertions ludicrous.   
The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmad 
Chalabi told us everything was going to be swellso we predicted that 
everything was going swell, and we did not plan for things not being so 
swell.97 
Feith suggested that Rumsfield and the other senior members of the administration 
would have to be complete simpletons to put so much faith in a single source.  Of 
course this begs the question of why Secretary Rumsfield was so adamant to reduce U.S. 
troop strength, particularly when doing so contradicted the advice of his most senior                                                 
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military advisors.  OSD was clearly planning on a different post-war environment than 
that which was encountered.  To what extent did Chalabis lingering influence and 
assumptions, such as the anticipated Shii reaction to an invasion, shape this belief?   
E. NECESSITY VS. FEASIBILITY 
It is implausible that Chalabi could single-handedly be the root of all evil that 
plagues post-war efforts in Iraq.  But Chalabi may have had significant influence within 
the administration and in shaping pre-war intelligence.  This is the premise of the second 
hypothesis.  Moreover, it also suggests that the strategic implications and rational for 
removing Saddam Hussein were so great that it perpetuated a come what may attitude, 
that is, it assumed that what followed in the aftermath of the invasion would be 
manageable.  To put it simply, OSD became transfixed on the removal of Saddam and 
focused on winning the conventional fight.    
Feith also described a leadership philosophy that prevailed through the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense; it was a philosophy that accepted uncertainty.  Operating in an 
uncertain environment is a familiar task to any officer who has served on a planning 
staff.  There is also a fine line, however, between a manageable risk and a blind leap of 
faith.  As military planners put it, hope is neither a plan nor a course of action. 
Following the first Gulf War in 1991, U.S. policymakers assumed that Saddam 
Hussein would never be fully accepted in the international community, and that he was 
actively attempting to develop WMD capabilities.98  From 1991 to 1997, under the 
Clinton administrations policy of dual containment, the U.S. tried to keep Iraq 
strategically weak and politically isolated through U.N. weapons inspections and limited 
trade embargos.99  The administration initially believed that such efforts would 
sufficiently weaken the regime so it might be toppled from within.  Neoconservatives 
within the administration, however, actively fought for more aggressive actions.  This 
culminated in an open letter to President Clinton100 advocating regime change. The 
letter was drafted by Richard Perle and signed by over 40 neoconservative luminaries, 
                                                
98 Marshall, 4.   
99 Established via U.N. Resolutions 687 (April 3, 1991) and 661 (August 6, 1990), respectively. 
100 Richard Perle, A Letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998. 
37 
many of whom would later became advisors to President Bush, including Donald 
Rumsfield and Paul Wolfowitz.101  
As early as 1997, the United States realized that not only had Saddams regime 
proved to be exceedingly resilient, but it had flourished under the imposed sanctions, 
albeit at the expense of the Iraqi people.  With the help of Saddam, the international 
community became increasingly aware of the humanitarian crisis purportedly 
exacerbated by the sanctions. As a result, international support for sanctions 
deteriorated.   
To make matters worse, Saddam begrudgingly cooperated with U.N. weapons 
inspectors because he thought that a favorable ruling on the absence of any WMD 
programs would effectively remove restrictions on Iraqi oil exports.  When it became 
clear to Saddam that the chances of such a ruling were unlikely, he became increasingly 
uncooperative and ultimately expelled U.N. inspectors from Iraq in November of 1998.  
The Clinton administration responded by launching Operation Desert Fox, a precision 
bombing campaign designed to destroy suspected WMD sites and other military 
installations.  It also shifted U.S. policy from containment toward an active pursuit of 
regime change, resulting in the Iraq Liberation Act.102  From 1998 until 2002, despite 
limited IAEA inspections over NPT compliance, there was little effective oversight of 
alleged Iraqi WMD programs.   
The neoconservative hawks also tried to place regime change at the top of 
the Bush administrations foreign policy agenda.103  However, early efforts were 
effectively stymied by the Department of State, especially Colin Powell and Richard 
Armitage, even though Armitage had signed the Clarke letter to President Clinton.104  
The tragic events of September 11 changed thatthe demonstrated vulnerability of the 
United States suggested that the threat of a WMD attack on U.S. soil was increasingly 
high.  Iraq was back on the table and neoconservatives drafted a new letter emphasizing 
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the need to take preemptive action against Iraq.  The ability or inability to directly link 
Saddam with September 11 became an ancillary consideration.105  
Montgomery Meigs has described the attacks of September 11 as the 
idiosyncratic application of a conventional resource.106  Rather, by weaponizing a 
common facet of everyday life in the United States to produce mass casualties, terrorists 
effectively shattered previous notions of what was formerly considered safe.  
Suddenly, everything from delivery trucks to model airplanes became a potential threat.  
While this categorization is accurate, it is also difficult to conceptualize and next to 
impossible to defend against, because our tactics, doctrine, and procedures are all 
designed to respond to more conventional tactics.  Thus as the nation struggled with the 
apparently large security dilemma exposed by the attacks, WMDs became a principal 
threat to be reckoned with because they are tangible, and we can conceptualize and 
model attacks based on their anticipated use.  We can also take the offensive and 
preemptively remove them by targeting those countries and organizations with known 
WMD capabilities.  With respect to Iraq, the intent to procure WMD had been 
previously established, and in the absence of viable oversight after 1998, a significant 
dilemma was created for the administration:  Should the administration attempt to 
remove Saddam preemptively, or wait, and potentially face an even greater challenge in 
mobilizing domestic and international support at a later date?  NSC advisor Condoleezza 
Rice summed up the conventional wisdom in the administration, noting, we did not 
want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.107 
By illustrating the domestic strategic paradigm, in consonance with the 
international aspects as introduced in Chapter I, we can reconstruct a baseline of thought 
introduced at very early stages.  As planning unfolded to address how the U.S. would 
remove Saddams regime, feasibility and consequences became ancillary concerns.  
Senior administration officials did not ask can this be done or what happens if, they 
instead focused on the essential task of regime decapitation.  Joshua Marshal described a 
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very linear logic that is difficult to challenge, a checklist approach that drives one to 
the foregone conclusions that feasibility is not the issue and preventing Saddams 
acquisition and future use of WMD was of strategic necessity.108 
F. REGIME CHANGE OR REGIME REMOVAL? 
Generally speaking, war plans usually follow four distinct phases: diplomatic 
engagement; initial shaping operations; decisive combat operations; and transition to 
post-war/peacekeeping environments.  While the timelines for the first three are largely 
controlled by the superior military force, the transition from combat to peacekeeping 
operations is often murky, convoluted, and contested.  It is thus often the hardest, most 
difficult, and potentially most open-ended part of the plan.  What exactly constitutes 
success?  Ironically, it also receives the least amount of attention from military planners, 
who tend to focus on offensive operations planning.  This is how they are trained and it 
becomes their comfort zone.  Thus, in almost every case an A-Team/B-Team mentality 
occurs, the general perception being that the heavy hitters get to plan for combat, 
while the other team plans for peace.  In addition, the planning timelines for each 
phase are often out of balance.  For example, General Franks had almost one year to 
plan Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Any officer assigned to Central Command (CENTCOM) 
during that period would confirm that it was an incredibly accelerated timeline.109  
Although planning efforts were initially organized around a pre-existing war plan 
(1003), it needed extensive revisions because it had not been revisited since 1998.  In 
addition, significant resource constraints imposed both by the Secretary of Defense, who 
initially wanted to execute the plan with less than a quarter of the specified troop 
strength, but also in order to meet other operational requirements, significantly 
complicated the planning process.  In contrast, General Jay Garner (retired), who was 
appointed to head the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, had just 
two months of planning time prior to the commencement of offensive operations in Iraq.  
His office was in charge of implementing transition (phase IV) operations in Iraq, but it 
was assigned a fraction of the planning and operation staff received by the other phases.   
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In some ways this was unavoidable, because the State Department lacked the 
significant personnel necessary to implement such plans.  Although armed with the 
Department of States Future of Iraq Project report, over thirteen volumes of 
information that has proven exceedingly accurate in forecasting post-war difficulties, the 
State Department offered more concerns than solutions.  Given the accelerated timeline 
of an approaching war, and with senior DOS leadership increasingly embroiled with the 
U.N. council, many have argued that the ORHA mission was doomed from the start.   
Another factor, now commonly cited as evidence of OSDs preoccupation with 
winning the offensive fight, was the troop-to-task ratio that was begrudgingly 
authorized.  With heavy emphasis on special operations and precision guided munitions 
in lieu of a more robust ground presence, OSD became convinced, based on early 
successes in Afghanistan, of the viability of that model.  This approach proved 
extraordinarily effective in surgically removing Saddams weak conventional force 
structure, while preserving existing Iraqi infrastructure.  Following combat operations, 
however, Special Forces and precision guided munitions could not effectively patrol 
neighborhoods and streets.  Moreover, early misperceptions regarding the potential 
reactions of Iraqs indigenous populace lingered among U.S. planners.  Thomas White, 
former Secretary of the Army stated that: 
The planning assumptions were that the people would realize they were 
liberated, they would be happy that we were there, so it would take a 
much smaller force to secure the peace than it did to win the war.110 
Planning under this assumption has significantly hampered the ability of the U.S. 
military to effectively control the security situation in post-war Iraq. 
Arguably the problem that most fuels the insurgency today is a lack of security.  
There are simply not enough coalition forces to saturate effectively the hot zones, nor 
are Iraqi security forces being trained at a rate fast enough to replace coalition forces.  
The situation on the ground will not improve until effective security is established.  In 
retrospect, it is clear that OSD became myopically focused on quickly removing the 
regime, which left the considerably more difficult task of replacing it unaddressed. 
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G. OTHER AGENCY RIFTS 
By the spring of 2002 there were considerable disagreements within the Bush 
administration over how to remove Saddam.111  Nonetheless, agencies such as the DOD 
and State Department were given a deadline of 15 April 2002 to quell interagency 
disputes and devise a cohesive plan to achieve this goal.  As a result of the ultimatum, 
the normal planning procedures became marginalized.112  For example, several 
preliminary studies were not included in the formal planning process because they had 
not been completed due to resource constraints or were deemed unimportant.  The 
indirect effect of accelerating this timeline was that OSD began to sideline the 
information and concerns coming from other agencies.   
Not surprisingly, the Department of State had been working on a comprehensive 
project entitled the Future of Iraq since early 2002, but which only really began to 
circulate within DOD at the eve of war in 2003.  In addition, using the Future of Iraq 
plan CIA planners began a series of war gaming exercises in late May.113  In the early 
stages these exercises were also attended by DOD representatives who were later 
reprimanded for their involvement.114  Interestingly, two of the recurring themes in these 
scenarios were early regime collapse and mass disorder or civil war.    
A multitude of supporting agencies became engaged in similar endeavors.  In 
August of 2002 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hosted a discussion on the case 
for war in Iraq.  One of the principal themes to come from the conference was the need 
to commit adequate resources and have a viable plan for post-war operations.115  Nearly 
all in attendance agreed that the occupation of Iraq would prove to be much more 
difficult than ousting Saddam.  Through the fall and winter of 2002 the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), who developed response plans for identified hot 
spots and also serves as an interagency coordinator, met with groups such as the 
International Rescue Committee, Refugees International, the Red Cross, and other 
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NGOs concerned with Iraq.  In the course of studying numerous recent humanitarian 
assistance operations in the 1990s, USAID concluded that the loss of security, even for a 
short time, could have serious long-term effects.116  Finally, the Army War College 
published a study in February of 2003 detailing the lessons learned from post-war 
operations in Germany and Japan.  In consonance with the internal DOD opposition, the 
War College echoed the importance of a robust security presence.117  Advocates for 
increased troop strength argued that although war time objectives would be met, it was 
highly likely that the U.S. could become bogged down in the aftermath.118  
Remarkably, the endeavors of these agencies had little impact on the evolving plan 
within DOD. Their findings of were viewed by OSD as mere impediments to an 
inevitable war of strategic necessity.119 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
The aforementioned hypotheses represent widely disparate views toward the 
U.S. government.  The first suggests that the U.S. government was merely misled.  The 
second implies that it did not care if it was misled.  Each has some degree of explanatory 
power.  As is often the case, the truth lies somewhere in between.   
In the absence of the tragic events of September 11, the U.S. would have taken 
much longer to remove Saddam Hussein, if it did so at all.  However, the attacks set a 
chain of events into motion.  In Plan of Attack Bob Woodward demonstrates that 
these events began to take on a life of their own.  Few people outside the administration 
really know when the decision was ultimately made to remove Saddam.  Specifically, 
when did events move beyond the point of no return?  Clearly, the answer to this 
important question would vary across the agencies and through the ranks.   
In any case, the timeline was accelerated considerably in the wake of the attacks, 
which created new obstacles.  As a result, the various agencies became isolated, 
narrowly focused on their respective tasks and responsibilities.  The DOD focused on an 
offensive campaign to topple Saddam, one that would do so with minimal casualties and                                                 
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troops, emphasizing the technological and tactical advantages of U.S. forces.  The DOS, 
although initially resistive and challenging many DOD assumptions, made the case to 
the U.N. security council for Iraqs alleged WMD and terrorist linkages.  The CIA and 
other intelligence agencies roles were limited to searching for and providing select 
intelligence to support the other agencies, while the facts on the ground exceedingly 
fell on deaf ears.  Meanwhile, the administration actively sought to build domestic and 
international support for U.S. endeavors.  At the same time, many prewar assumptions, 
such as those promulgated by Ahmad Chalabi and the INC in the late 1990s, escaped 
scrutiny at the higher levels.  Such misinformation became increasingly important as 
war plans evolved.  Lack of effective oversight created conflict not only within the 
various agencies, but among them as well. As a result, the interagency process broke 
down.  Without good interagency communication, the planning process became more 
susceptible to dubious information and the messengers of misinformation, such as  
Ahmad Chalabi, who capitalized on these conditions to circumvent the normal 
intelligence vetting process and to ensure U.S. plans for regime removal remained on 
course.   
With respect to the Shiis, the end result may be judged by history as one of the 
greatest ironies in the new millennium.  For over 20 years, U.S. policy has sought to 
contain the perceived threat of Shii Islam to regional interests.  Now, for the first time, 
the U.S. government is relying on them to create a stable and prosperous Iraq.  The 
necessity to achieve this post-war vision was predominately responsible for the drastic 
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IV. REVISING PERSPECTIVES TOWARD IRAQI SHIIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter explained how perceptions toward Iraqi Shiis within the 
U.S. government shifted during the 1990s.  A series of misperceptions were formulated 
and promulgated throughout the administration preceding OIF.  By 2003, the Shiis 
seemed conducive to the administrations goal of regime change.  This chapter 
challenges the previously articulated pre-war assumptions with respect to the Shiis, 
demonstrating that a careful study of Iraqs history would have alleviated much 
misunderstanding.  It begins by examining Shii history in Iraq and significant events 
that have defined Shiis today.  It then challenges the notions that the Shiis are 
monolithic, decidedly pro-American, and open to Western forms of secular democracy.  
The intent is to create a revised perspective of Iraqs Shiis, one that more accurately 
reflects the realities on the ground in post-war Iraq.  
B. A BRIEF HISTORY ON THE RISE AND FALL OF SHIIS IN IRAQ 
The conversion of Iraqs nomadic tribes to Shiism is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Shiism gained momentum in the 19th century following Ottoman attempts 
to settle the nomadic tribes as a means of cultivating increased agricultural production.  
The success of this policy reflects the increased effectiveness of governments 
throughout the Middle East during this period.  From the beginning, a demographic split 
was created between Iraqs Sunnis, increasingly concentrated in the urban centers of 
influence, such as Baghdad, and the recently converted Shiis who settled largely in the 
countryside near Najaf and Karbala.120   
The conversion of the nomadic tribes to sedentary agriculture practices 
inevitably fractured their former political and social infrastructures.  Shii rituals and 
religious practices not only filled many of these gaps, but also provided the means by 
which the mujtahids attempted to unify the tribes and organize political structures.121  In 
addition, the proliferation of sayyids throughout the tribal villages helped ease the 
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transitions to Shii law.122  The relationship between sayyid families and tribal shaykhs 
was strengthened through intermarriage and a new social order emerged led by the larger 
tribal shaykhs and grand mujtahids. 
Following the Ottoman surrender in 1918, Britain occupied three diverse 
Mesopotamian provinces in Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.123  These provinces were 
artificially joined into a new state under the British mandate system in 1920.  The 
challenges of statehood were immense.  Not only was the Arab majority divided along 
religious lines (Sunnis and Shiis), but the provinces were deeply riven, with a 
countryside dominated by tribal federations, large Kurdish and Assyrian Christian 
minorities, as well as a significant Jewish population in Baghdad.  The challenges of 
such diversity were clear and Britains attempt to impose a more centralized government 
was met with revolt. 
The 1920 revolt divided Iraqi Sunnis and Shiis along political lines.  Mirza 
Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, following the death of Kazim Yazdi on 29 April 1919, 
emerged as the leading mujtahid among the Shiis.124  Shirazi and his son Muhammad 
Rida were very influential in setting the religious agenda amongst the Shii ulama.  The 
revolt was largely a response to British socio-economic policies in both Iran and Iraq, 
which were seen as a direct threat to the power and influence of the mujtahids.  
Specifically, British endeavors to control pilgrimages to the shrine cities adversely 
affected the principal means of income in those areas, which in turn reduced popular 
support for the mujtahids.  Despite their religious differences, Iraqs Sunnis and Shiis 
shared many tribal and cultural traditions.  As such, in the early 1920s it was not 
difficult to unify behind a common goal of removing the British.  However, the Sunnis 
did not support Shii political agendas or their aspirations for greater political influence.  
The revolt failed to achieve either an end to British occupation or an improved role for 
Shiis in Iraqi politics.  As a result, in the future Iraqi Sunnis became increasing 
distrustful of any autonomous and politically active Shii religious activity.  The 1920 
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revolt thus created the initial rift between Iraqs Shiis and Sunnis.125  Later attempts by 
Shiis to gain influence within the political realm would be seen as threatening and 
hostile to Sunnis.   
The 1920 revolt cost the British dearly, economically and politically, as well as 
in terms of domestic support for continued presence.126  As a result, Britain pursued 
strategies that would secure their interests in the region, principally by opening lines of 
communication with India and securing access to Iraq and Iranian oil fields, while 
minimizing direct involvement local governance.127  Local rule was left instead to the 
British established Sunni monarchy under King Faysal.   
Najaf and Karbala became less important as Baghdad emerged as the new 
political center of the state.  While the British-imposed Sunni government patronized the 
tribal shayhks in an ongoing effort to secure their loyalties and cooperation, the mujtahid 
were becoming isolated as the state became secularized.  Unlike the Iranian Shii ulama, 
who retained much of their traditional power under Pahlavis regime, in Iraq the state 
removed much of this power from the mujtahids by controlling Shii institutions, 
specifically madrasa and waqf properties.128   
Much of the conflict between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiis can thus be reduced to a 
power struggle for the rights to rule the state and to shape the emerging nationalism.  
While Shiis tended to promote Iraqi nationalism, this was seen as contradictory to the 
greater Sunni goals of Pan-Arabism.  This is an important distinction, since later Sunni 
efforts to discredit Shiis politically were centered upon the notion of Shiism as a 
heresy motivated by Persian hatred of Arabs.129  In fact, prior to coming to power in 
1968, the Baath party began to denounce Shiis by referring to them as shuubi, a 
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historically derogatory term which referred to Persians and Aramaeans that cursed the 
privileged positions of Arabs in the eighth and ninth centuries.   
In 1958 the monarchy was overthrown and replaced with a Shii ruler Abd al-
Karim Qasim.  Qasim promoted Iraqi nationalism and borrowed much from the 
Egyptian nationalist party lines by advocating the preservation of national identities and 
resisting affiliations with other states, unlike Pan-Arabism.  Because of his politics 
Qasim was a prime target for Baathists who labeled him both a separatist and shuubi 
despot.  He was assassinated in 1963 by Baathists, ostensibly for his refusal to join the 
United Arab Republic.  He is remembered by Shiis as the nationalist leader who 
attempted to reform the state by removing the sectarian divisions and subordination of 
Shiis to the ruling Sunni minority.  His legacy marks the apogee of Shii influence in 
Iraqi politics and the beginning of its rapid decline. 
C. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF IRAQI SHIIS 
The Baath party came to power in 1968 and continued to preserve a system that 
marginalized Iraqi Shiis politically and economically.  In the years following World 
War Two many Shiis migrated to Baghdad, joining the urban labor force as well as civil 
and government service sectors.  Their interests diversified and any misgivings toward 
the regime were usually manifested in economic and political issues rather than matters 
of religion.130  William Cleveland describes these urban Shiis as having become 
diversified, as they were not a monolithic community with a common attitude toward the 
government.131  They had in fact become partially assimilated within a modernizing 
urban culture. 
Religious identity remained important in the south and the influence of the Shii 
ulama remained strong within Shii circles at the tribal level.  The Shii ulama and their 
followers opposed the Baath regime on three principals: 1) the secularism of the 
regime, 2) the exclusion of Shiis from the higher echelons of government, 3) and 
Sunnis incessant attempts to dominate all social and religious organizations within Iraqi 
society.132  The Dawa Party (Islamic Call) was created in secret by the ulama in 1957, 
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and advocated the removal of the regime in exchange for an Islamic government.  Iraqi 
Shiis, frustrated by diminished opportunities and the lack of equivalent political 
representation, united behind the partys ideology.  Recruitment into the party surged 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, and resulted in major revolts in 1977 and 1979 
during the pilgrimage rites of Karbala and Najaf.133  The Baath regime became alarmed 
at the growing level of resentment and organized protests, and arrested several persons 
with alleged affiliations to the party.  In addition, in 1979 the Ayatollah Khomeini took 
power in Iran.  The connection between Iranian and Iraqi Shiis was a tremendous 
unknown for the regime and became one of the principal Iraqi justifications for the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).134   
To some degree, the regimes suspicions of Iran were correct.  The Iranian 
Revolution fostered strong anti-regime sentiments among Iraqi Shiis, ultimately leading 
the Dawa party to challenge the regime.135  However, although pressing for an Islamic 
government, the partys leader Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr acknowledged that the 
conditions for an Iranian-style revolution did not exist in Iraq.136  Iranian Shiis 
advocated the rule of the jurist, a spiritual-juridical figure who commanded absolute 
religious and political authority, which did not find much favor with Dawa members in 
Iraq.137  In addition, many Iraqi Shiis were nationalistic and were not interested in a 
potential merger with Iran.  Nonetheless, following the execution of Baqir al-Sadr by the 
Baath, the Dawa party was effectively fractured into several groups, which until 
Operation Iraqi Freedom were largely based abroad, primarily in Iran, Syria, and 
Britain.138  
Throughout the Iran/Iraq War, Saddam Hussein faced the challenge of securing 
the loyalties of Shii that constituted the bulk of his armed forces.  The Iraqi government 
pursued several strategies that stressed an Iraqi Shii.  However, these policies had the 
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unintended effect of reinforcing a distinct Shii sense of self.139  Another means by 
which Saddam Hussein and the Baath party fractured Shii unity in the south was 
through kinship and tribalism, or what Amatzia Baram describes as neo-tribalism.140  
After completely denouncing tribalism in favor of Iraqi unity and nationalism, the 
Baath completely switched polices following the intifada in March of 1991.141  In many 
such cases Baath policies regarding tribalism conflicted.  Initially, cooperation with 
tribal shaykhs was an effective tactic that Saddam used to achieve control and influence.  
Later, tribal values became important considerations for young men recruited into 
Saddams elite Republican and Special Republican Guard units.  In addition, Saddams 
patronage to his own al-Tikriti tribe was so pronounced that he insisted the al-Tikriti 
be removed from his name, lest it raise the specter of nepotism.142   
During the Intifada several loyal tribal shayhks refused to participate, a point we 
will return to later, which greatly facilitated the suppression of the uprising.  Based on 
this experience, Saddam quickly realized the potential of cultivating the tribal shayhks.  
It would be through this unequal patronage, based on loyalty and affiliation with the 
Baath regime that the Shiis in the southern Iraq would be further isolated and 
marginalized. 
D. THE INTIFADA OF 1991 AND THE SEEDS OF DISTRUST 
The presumption that Iraqi Shiis would welcome a prolonged alliance with the 
U.S. government overlooks a legacy created during the Intifada following the first Gulf 
War in 1991.  As discussed earlier, Saddam tried to gain legitimacy and support through 
his tribal policies in the Shii south.  Those who were loyal to the regime were rewarded; 
others were crushed mercilessly.143  Loyalty did not necessarily mean taking up arms 
against fellow Shii, simply refusing to participate was enough in many cases.  That the 
uprising occurred during a harvest season did not help foster participation either, 
                                                
139 Tripp, 246.   
140 Amatzia Baram, Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Husseins Tribal Policies 1991-96. 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, 1997, 1-31. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights, Reports on the 
situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Prepared by Max Van Der Stoel, Special Report on Human Rights 
(1992-9).  http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1995/a-50-734.htm.  Accessed April 2004. 
51 
because the local harvest determined the survival of many southern Shii families.  
Finally, many Shiis resisted participation in the uprising based on their personal 
morality and sense of nationalism.144  Thus, there were tremendous perceived and real 
costs associated with participating or even being affiliated with the uprising.  Joining the 
uprising was a tremendous risk, and the decision to do so was often heavily influenced 
by U.S. promises of support. 
The Intifada, though disorganized and spontaneous, was stimulated by outside 
influences as well as internal opposition and spread widely.145  One of the earliest events 
prior to the formal insurrection occurred in early February near Diwaniyya, when several 
Shiis protested Saddams refusal to evacuate Kuwait.  The protest grew in intensity and 
ten Baath party officials were killed.146  Several days later President George Bush Sr. 
made the first of several public calls for Iraqis to stage an internal revolt to topple the 
regime.  The ground war began on 24 February. Within days, the Iraqis withdrew from 
Kuwait and the U.S. military and coalition forces occupied large portions of southern 
Iraq.  By this time, the insurrection was spreading rapidly across Shii towns in southern 
Iraq, including Basra, Amara, Nasiriyya, and Kut.147  On 7 March, faced with large 
protests and demonstrations in the shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, the Iraqi 
government publicly acknowledged that it was facing an internal revolt.  The Kurds in 
the north also began to commit to the cause and joined the revolt within a few days.  
Fueled by years of repression and hatred for the regime, the rebels summarily executed 
dozens of Baath party officials and collaborators.   
Along with several exile groups and opposition parties, Iran expressed cautious 
support for the rebellion.  On 8 March the Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani 
publicly denounced Saddam Hussein, openly calling for his resignation.148  Publicly, 
Iranian support consisted of little more than an aggressive campaign of media 
propaganda.  However, the head of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in 
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Iraq (SCIRI), Baqir al-Hakim, who was exiled and operating from Iran, sent several 
thousand rebels from SCIRIs private army, known as the Badr Brigade, across the 
border to assist the opposition.149  In addition, several allegations were made by Kuwaiti 
and other allied officials that Iran was providing additional humanitarian and military 
aid.150  Iran later admitted that this aid was intended to facilitate the formation of a 
friendly Shii Muslim government.   
The U.S. governments position toward the uprising became increasingly 
convoluted.  On the one hand, President Bush still called upon the Iraqi people to rebel 
against Saddam. U.S. intelligence estimates, however, questioned the uprisings 
viability.151  The U.S. government was faced with a difficult choice, since a successful 
uprising seemed to require considerable aid and security support.  Senior Iraqi military 
officials were also concerned by the possible social disintegration in Iraq.  Former 
President Bushs call to arms ironically caused an uprising that may have actually 
prevented the military coup the U.S. government was trying to incite.  As the Iraqi 
military subsequently became involved with controlling the rebellion and preserving law 
and order, the military leadership rallied around Saddam.152  A second miscalculation by 
occurred during the first week of March 1991.  Faced with such a rapid and concise 
defeat, which surprised even the U.S. government, many Iraqi commanders nonetheless 
considered joining the rebellion.  The costs for being on the losing team were of 
course severe.  However, some analysts believe that if the U.S. government had 
supported or even encouraged the rebels in the weeks that followed, a military coup 
might have been feasible.153  In any case these opportunities were lost and Saddam was 
able to crush the rebellion and isolate remaining pockets of resistance within weeks.154 
The consequences of failure were severe for the Shiis in the south.  Saddams 
violent reprisals, which contrasted markedly with the response to the Kurdish resistance, 
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were motivated in part by his sense of Shii betrayal.155  For days, Saddam loyalists 
shelled Shii shrines and mosques in Najaf and Karbala.  The southern marshes thought 
to be hiding Shii insurgents were completely drained, an unparalleled environmental 
catastrophe.  During the sanctions period immediately after the war, average annual per 
capita income sank from $4,083 to $485-$300 in the years that followed 1991.156  Over 
60% of the country sank below the poverty line, and much of southern Iraq became a 
barren wasteland with Shiis incurring the greatest costs. 
The Shiis historical memory toward the U.S. government is thus one of betrayal 
and mistrust.  As one rebel put it, Bush said that we should rebel against Saddam.  We 
rebelled against Saddam, but where is Bush?157  In contrast, with growing pressure 
from Riyadh and concerns over fundamentalist Iranians, the U.S. government switched 
from support of the uprising to a hands off approach.  The U.S. military even provided 
some tactical support to contain the Intifada.158  There were several reports, for example, 
that the CIA actively denied rebels access to weapons and ammo caches and rerouted 
several shipments of arms to Afghanistan to aid the jihadis.159     
Iraqi Shiis are anxious for a fair share of power and political influence in the 
new Iraq, and the new political landscape holds tremendous opportunities.  However, 
experience has made the Shiis wary of U.S. government actions and interests, 
especially with regard to oil.  While Um Qasr, Safwan, Basra, and others all fell into 
civil disorder following the ground offensive, for example, some of the coalitions first 
security actions during Operation Iraqi Freedom were to seize and protect the oil fields.  
Safwan and Um Qasr were border towns that swelled with refugees and civil unrest, yet 
daily the Iraqi citizens witnessed a parade of convoys passing through from bases in 
Kuwait, each carrying the apparatus of security and support to more important 
objectives.  Based on these experiences, the Shiis are extremely hesitant to engage in  
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long-term commitments or partnerships with the U.S. government.  In fact, cooperation 
with the U.S. military has had the indirect effect of discrediting many tribal and religious 
organizations amongst both Shiis and Sunnis.160 
E. WHY THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS PLANS FOR A SECULAR 
DEMOCRACY MAY NOT SUCCEED IN IRAQ 
Two of the most troubling assumptions the U.S. government has made is that a 
liberated, democratic Iraq would result in a wave of democratization throughout the 
Middle-East and that a friendly Iraqi government could effectively replace the faltering 
Saudi alliance, and ensure continued U.S. presence and influence within the region.  One 
of the more troubling matters is the influence Chalabi has had in shaping these 
perceptions within the U.S. government and the resultant effects this had on the decision 
to remove Saddam.161  Chalabi convinced the national security hawks that despite the 
Shii majority in a democratic Iraq the Shiis would be largely secular in mindset and 
uninterested in a Khomeinist theocracy.162  However, nothing could have been further 
from the truth.  Chalabi left Iraq in 1958.  Since that time, Iraqi Shiis have been 
continuously repressed and brutalized by a regime focused on minimizing their political 
and religious influence.  As a byproduct of this environment, radical Islamism has 
emerged in greater strength, as have increasing numbers of poverty stricken youth 
influenced heavily by Khomeinist ideas.   
Recent history seriously undermines Chalabis assertions.  In response to the 
Shii uprisings of 1977 and the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Baath Party implemented 
several policies to restrict and repress Shii religious activities.  Membership in the 
Dawa party became illegal and their leading theorist, Baqir al-Sadr, was executed in 
1980.  As a result, the party became an underground movement.  Many members left 
Iraq to promote and expand party interests abroad.  During the 1980s and 1990s over 
200,000 Iraqi Shiis with al Dawa affiliations, fled to Iran, while another major Dawa 
base of operations was established in London.163  From 1992-1995 the London based 
Dawa branch become involved with the Iraqi National Congress (INC), founded and 
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financed by Ahmad Chalabi, which also received funding and support from the CIA.164  
In 1982, Shii activists in Iran created the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (SCIRI, also referred to as SAIRI), a movement designed to promote the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein.165  These groups have been extremely active over the past decade in 
formulating plans for the future of Iraq. 
Within Iraq a division has occurred over the past decade within the Shii 
populace, resulting in two opposing factions.  Iraqs Shiis rejected traditionally 
Khomeinis ideas regarding clerical rule.  Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr became one of the 
leading theorists for the Dawa party in Iraq and advocated government by an elected 
assembly.166  These ideas were effectively transmitted during the 1970s and 80s through 
the senior clergymen or the Object of Emulation, the senior, most experienced Shii 
scholar.  Following the untimely death of Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei in 1992, however, a 
split emerged between the elder Shiis and the youth who grew up during the decades of 
repression.  The older Shiis continued to be influenced by one of al-Khoeis principal 
disciples, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, while the younger generation found favor in 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a distant cousin to Baqir al-Sadr.  Sadiq al-Sadr made up for 
his lack of religious credibility and authority by his ability to mobilize a disenfranchised 
youth, and for his aggressive actions in defiance of the regime.  Unlike Ali Sistani, Sadiq 
al-Sadr accepted Khomeinis theories of divine rule of the jurisprudent, and felt capable 
of serving in this capacity.167  His appeal won him over two million followers.168  After 
being warned on numerous occasions to tone down his religious rhetoric, however, he 
was assassinated by Saddams secret police in February of 1999.  While two of his sons 
faced a similar fate, a third, Muqtada al-Sadr, became an heir to his fathers legacy.  
With the increasing threat of war in 2003, Muqtada and his followers were already 
performing a remarkable job pursuing their own versions of debaathification in East 
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Baghdad, subsequently renamed Sadr City.  He continues to be a powerful political 
force in Iraq today. 
As the regime fell during the spring of 2003, the Dawa party reappeared in 
Nasiriya, Basra, and other southern cities.  While many members of the Iranian branch 
were unwilling to return to an Iraq under U.S. occupation, members of the London 
branch, who had former ties to Chalabi and the INC, won the U.S. favor through 
cooperation, and have subsequently returned from exile with their political agendas in 
tow.  The SCIRI also returned to Iraq in April and May, along with thousands of Badr 
Corps soldiers who slipped across the Iran/Iraq border and settled in the border towns.  
Despite the partys cooperation with the U.S. government, American and British troops 
had been involved in several unintended clashes with Badr Corps elements.169  The 
SCIRI and al-Sadr factions both advocate a form of clerical rule in Iraq.  While Sadr is 
much more confrontational with the U.S. government, the SCIRI had adopted a more 
passive, two-step approach: cooperate and then win by majority.  The destruction of the 
Baathist regime has thus opened a Pandoras Box as Shii factions compete for 
political and religious legitimacy in the new Iraq.  Not only was the U.S. government 
woefully unprepared to counter the expansion of Islamist movements in Iraq, it certainly 
did not expecting to face several entrenched political agendas over thirty years in the 
making.      
While secularism is certainly present in Iraq, with over 14 million advocates by 
some estimates, religion often finds a larger audience in times of hardship and despair, 
as it has throughout much of the Middle East.170  The absence of a thriving middle class 
has fostered the spread of Islamist movements.171  The current environment in Iraq is 
ripe for Islamist politics and many view the U.S. government led occupation as a golden 
opportunity to Islamize power and redress communal grievance.172  While a Shii  
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Islamic republic in Iraq is not a certainty, in the months following the U.S. militarys 
occupation it was the Shiis that consistently represented the clearest organizational 
skill and established political momentum.173   
The question is not so much whether democracy can flourish in Iraq, but rather 
what version of it is being imposed, and what will emerge.  There have been several 
recent opinion polls that suggest many Muslims favor democratic values and principles.  
However, the general opinion of the U.S. government and its policies toward the Middle 
East is also at an all-time low.174  Thus, the message itself may not be to blame if the 
messenger lacks sufficient credibility.  If a democratic model is to succeed, it must 
originate in Iraq and will most certainly reflect Islamic ideals and religious law.  In 
addition, many Americans forget the tumultuous path of our own democratic system.  
The blessing and the curse of the American model is its ability to change, and to be 
reflective of the current issues and concerns of the modern world.  However this poses 
many ideological problems for Islam.  Vali Nasr, a Professor at Naval Post Graduate 
School in Monterey, California, argues the divergence between Islam and democracy is 
over truths.  While Islam is concerned principally with absolute truths, democracy 
consists of relative truths based on the majority.175  While potentially supportive of 
democracy, Islam could translate into one man, one vote, one time.176  Thus, a 
democracy reflective of Islamic values may become, by definition, infallible and 
resistant to change, which in turn affects future popular support for the regime, for the 
nations stability, and its peoples prosperity.  Finally, even should it succeed, 
democracy may present some unintended consequences and challenges for U.S. policies 
within the region.  With respect to current Arab sentiments with Israel, how can a 
government more representative, i.e. democratic, in the Middle East be viewed as 
anything but increasingly threatening to Israelis or even to the Saudis?177  
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The truth is, that the majority of Iraqs Shiis generally fall into one of three 
broad political/Islamic movements, each one vying for an Islamic government, with 
perhaps a fourth capturing the secularists.  With or without democratic elections, the 
future Iraq will most likely be an Islamic state, with Shiis gaining unprecedented levels 
of power and influence.  The revised perspective offered in this chapter challenges the 
pre-war assumptions made by the U.S. government regarding the Shiis, and implies that 
to accomplish its previously articulated goals, the U.S. government will need to adjust 





For over 20 years, U.S. policy attempted to contain the perceived threat Shiism 
posed to regional interests and objectives as a cohesive, violent, radical, and anti-
Western movement.  These perceptions arose as a result of early British experiences in 
Iraq during the 1900s, and were inherited by the U.S. government when it assumed a 
dominant role in the Middle East during the 1970s.  They were later solidified through 
the U.S. governments experiences in Iran and Lebanon, and intensified during the 
1980s with the emergence of Islamist terrorism.    
However, as the U.S. military prepared to invade Iraq in 2002, such perceptions 
shifted to accommodate U.S. visions for a post-war Iraq.  The U.S. government began to 
believe that Iraqs Shiis would support efforts to remove Saddams regime and would 
welcome a Western-oriented, secular democracy.  This transition was neither immediate 
nor deliberate, and it occurred over an extended period, beginning with passive attempts 
at regime removal in the 1990s under the Clinton administration.  Lacking effective 
intelligence assets throughout the region, the U.S government relied on Iraqi exiles to 
facilitate these endeavors.  Exiles who stood to gain much from Saddams ouster, such 
as Ahmad Chalabi, went to great lengths to convince the administration of the viability 
of an externally-supported revolt.  Such a revolt assumed the support of the southern 
Shii majority, who, having suffered for decades under the regimes repression, would 
presumably back the revolt.178  Although these endeavors failed to produce the desired 
results, the assumptions about the Shii lingered and were perpetuated by emerging 
neoconservative ideologues within the U.S. government who also wanted to remove 
Saddam.  Despite the implementation of the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998, further 
attempts at regime removal by the U.S. government in the late 1990s were replaced by 
diplomatic efforts, including the Oslo Peace Process and other regional endeavors.   
The neoconservatives dominated the new Bush administration, and the events of 
September 11 2001 provided them with a justification to implement a more pragmatic 
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solution to deal with the perceived threats poised by Saddam.  Due to the severity of 
the attacks, and the existence of regimes with an expressed desire to threaten U.S. 
interests, the doctrine of preemptive attacks seemed justified.  The implementation of 
this doctrine accelerated efforts to remove Saddam Hussein by force.  This acceleration, 
necessitated by both the urgency of the perceived threat and the need to consolidate 
international and domestic support, had adverse effects on the interagency process.  
Regime removal instead of regime replacement became the focus of the 
neoconservatives, and prior assumptions that supported this endeavor indirectly became 
the foundation for the evolving war plan.  These assumptions have proved incorrect and 
resulted in a post-war environment very different from that which was planned.  The 
views and attitudes of Iraqs peoples, including the Shii, are much more diverse than 
anticipated, and their distrust and fear of America persists.  Thus, imposing democracy 
has proved to be a significant challenge.  As the U.S. government struggled to repair the 
state and civil infrastructures, which were in far greater disarray than previously 
estimated, security became a secondary consideration.  As prior planning assumptions 
began to unravel, political, social, and confessional cleavages were revealed and the 
security situation began to worsen.   
B. IMPLICATIONS 
While many factors well beyond the scope of this thesis have contributed to the 
deteriorating post-war environment, the U.S. government missed a major opportunity in 
its quest to promote stability in Iraq when it did not consult with Shii leaders at an 
earlier stage.  The U.S. government was hesitant to engage with religious leaders and 
underestimated their influence and control over the southern Shii populace, preferring 
instead to identify and foster relationships with secular leaders.  This contributed to 
initial problems in many southern Iraqi cities such as Basra, Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Kut, 
problems that worsened during uprisings involving followers of al-Sadr.   
The media has also propagated misunderstandings about the post-war 
environment and the nature of the insurgent threat.  In early 2004, reports of Shii 
uprisings in Sadr City and other areas suggested a monolithic insurgency, when the truth 
is, that there remains significant internal political conflicts amongst the Shiis.  Many 
commentators failed to notice, for instance, when Moktada al-Sadr moderated his 
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opposition in an effort to participate in the political process.  Recent reporting generally 
labels the insurgency as a Sunni-based movement that groups al-Qaeda sympathizers, 
former Baathists, and those attempting to reestablish Sunni dominance.  This 
perspective is dangerous since it masks and mislabels underlying social currents.  While 
the generalization may hold true for the most violent groups, increasing numbers of 
Iraqis, including the Shiis, are becoming openly frustrated by the lack of progress.  
Many Iraqis, in turn, are now tolerating insurgent activity.179    
The emergence of a second Shii state seems likely, given the Shiis large 
majority in Iraq.  In and of itself, Shii political ascendancy has tremendous implications 
for the region, U.S. relations within the Middle East, and the larger Islamic world.  The 
extent to which these implications, had they been acknowledged, would have impacted 
the decision to remove Saddam is now of secondary importance.  Suffice it to say, a 
secure and stable Iraq, instead of one plagued by insurgency and civil war, will be more 
conducive to U.S. interests.  
Shii opposition in post-war Iraq has been minimized, largely as a result of the 
Shii clergy who seem willing, for the moment, to allow the political process to proceed.  
If this should change, the results could be disastrous.  A forced withdrawal by the U.S. 
military from Iraq would be akin to rolling the dice on the potential outcome.  The 
absence of a moderating force in Iraq leaves the nation at the mercy of the neighboring 
countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey.    
C. CONSIDERATIONS 
Any hope of success in Iraq requires a radical transformation in the way the U.S. 
government perceives both the abstract problem and the messy realities of the countrys 
political, social, and spiritual geography.  With respect to the Shii, the lesson that must 
be taken from the initial blunders is the need to engage Shii leaders at all levels, 
including the religious hierarchy.  The U.S. government cannot begin to discuss 
emerging forms of democracy without accepting to some degree the presence and 
integration of political Islam.  To complicate matters, the Shiis are not monolithic with 
respect to these views.  Numerous Shii religious groups are now vying for political 
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representation and influence.  It is essential to understand what these parties represent at 
multiple levels, politically, socially, and ideologically.  This will challenge previous 
U.S. tendencies to stonewall organizations with alleged terrorist affiliations.  The U.S. 
government tends to apply such labels carelessly, but it cannot afford to let crude 
generalities impede progress.  Irbrahim al-Jaafari is a prime example of the subtle 
evaluations and ideological compromises that U.S. policymakers will need to make in 
coming years. Appointed Iraqs transitional Prime Minister in April of 2005, al-Jaafari is 
also a leading spokesman for the Iraqi Dawa party, a party with known affiliations with 
Hezbollah.  Despite these affiliations, it is nonetheless essential to maintain as many 
conduits for diplomatic engagement as possible, including with potential leaders like al-
Jaafari.  It is unclear if U.S. leaders are willing to understand and accept the complexity 
and multidimensional aspects of such relationships. 
Another challenge for the U.S. government will be to maintain open dialogues 
with popular leaders, while not appearing to support or condemn them directly because 
of their political stance toward the United States.  The U.S. government must focus on 
the domestic context of the problem.  Domestic security, stability, and progress must 
come first; attempts to shape international relations with an emerging state are 
premature.  With respect to potential leaders, if faced with the choice of what is good for 
Iraq versus what is good for the United States, in the long run the former may be the 
only way to achieve the latter. 
By the same token the U.S. government must acknowledge that its political 
favorites face an uphill battle, precisely because of the U.S. support that they enjoy. 
Some potential leaders who advocate moderate and tolerant agendas have been 
effectively marginalized because of their affiliations with the United States.  Prime 
Minister Iyad Allawi, for example, was politically weakened during Iraqs first elections 
amidst accusations of being a pro-Western puppet.  In contrast, early U.S. support of 
Allawi, himself a former Baathist who was rumored to be an ex-Mukhabarat agent 
under Saddam, may have puzzled many Iraqis.180  Our support of select individuals 
clearly sends a message to the populace about both our favorites and us.    
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The Shiis also have many perceptions about the U.S. government based on their 
own historical memories.  When the U.S. government assumed the trust and cooperation 
if the Shiis, it naively overlooked its own history with these long-oppressed Iraqis, 
especially the failed uprising of 1991 when the U.S. government abandoned the Shii to 
Saddams reprisals.   
A willingness to engage with the Shii at multiple levels will help correct 
previous mistakes.  Currently, many Shii are suspicious of the U.S. governments 
policies and future plans for Iraq.  One of the principal concerns is the nature and length 
of the proposed occupation.  For many Iraqis the size of the U.S. Green Zone and its 
central location in Baghdad suggests a permanent U.S. presence in Iraq, as has the 
magnitude of reconstruction and expansion of select military facilities, such as Talil Air 
Base in central Iraq.  In addition, many Iraqis have noted the remarkable and 
unprecedented effectiveness of Americas military power, but are confused by our 
inability to control the insurgency.  Many feel that this is of deliberate design, a scheme 
to assure a long term American presence in the region.181  Such ideas have become one 
of the primary recruiting tools used by many of the opposition groups.182  The U.S. 
government simply must do a better job of clarifying and publicizing its long-term 
objectives and milestones.  Encouraging and promoting active contact among the Shiis 
will reinforce the U.S. governments claims, with respect to its stated objectives, 
increase its legitimacy, and foster understanding and trust with the Iraqis it purports to 
liberate. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The U.S. governments chronic misreading of the Shiis has not been responsible 
for all the problems and setbacks in post-war Iraq.  There are much larger strategic and 
operational obstacles that must be overcome before Iraq can be construed as any sort of 
successful model for U.S. intervention in the Middle East.  However, one of the 
principal lessons of post-war Iraq is the need for greater understanding of the Shiis, as 
difficult and complex as this task may be.  Fostering cooperation with the Shiis is the 
only way for the U.S. government to achieve security and stability in post-war Iraq.  
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Regardless of what Iraqi government emerges, Shiis will no longer be politically 
marginalized, but will play a central role.  The U.S. government will be forced to work 
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